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Parental Alienation Syndrome is manifested in some children who have experienced 
post-separation conflict. Commonly the child aligns with the custodial parent and 
expresses strong wishes to sever all contact with the non-custodial parent. These 
strong wishes may include false allegations of neglect or abuse. It is believed -that 
this behaviour is caused by the indoctrinating actions of the custodial parent. If the 
child' s wishes are followed, one parent may be denied access altogether. There is 
much controversy surrounding the Syndrome in both the legal and medical forums. 
It is neither accepted nor ruled upon with any great consistency. This paper 
canvasses the formulation of the syndrome, its criticisms, and its treatment in 
various jurisdictions. The paper then concludes with an examination of five recent 
New Zealand cases in which Parental Alienation Syndrome was argued. 
Recommendations include: caution when allowing argument on the syndrome; 
ensuring that the judiciary does not simply defer to the opinion of the psychological 
expert; and making consistent orders when Parental Alienation Syndrome is found 
to be an operative factor. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibiliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 18 412 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the interests of children and respect for their wishes have 
been accorded increasingly greater recognition in the law. Particularly in the 
context of divorce and separation, it is progressively seen as a child's right to 
make their views on custody and access heard. What of the situation however, 
where the view expressed is a vehemently held wish to sever ties with one 
parent? This type of view causes concern because of its incompatibility with 
conventional wisdom on the subject. It is generally considered important for a 
child to have a relationship with both parents, to the extent that contact will be 
promoted even where one parent has proved themselves to be less than fit. 
Parental interaction on even the most basic level is regarded as serving 
a child's best interests. However it is also in the child's best interests to respect 
their choices as rational actors. The inquiry which then arises, is whether there 
is a danger that the wish expressed is not the true desire of the child but the 
internalisation of a disaffected parent's views. This is the realm of Parental 
Alienation Syndrome. 
Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) denotes a relatively new 
diagnosis, and describes a set of behaviours exhibited by some children in high-
conflict separations. It appears that there is little consensus either theoretically 
or in practice as to what constitutes PAS, how it is to be diagnosed or treated, or 
to what degree the law should take notice of it. Even without agreement on 
these issues however, instances of PAS are currently being alleged in custody 
disputes in many jurisdictions including New Zealand. The result of this has 
been necessarily inconsistent. While the syndrome remains very much in 
debate, inconsistency is further fuelled by a judicial reluctance to recognise or 
even name the diagnosis although it is ostensibly informing custody decisions. 
The result is that PAS is making little progress in either becoming legally 
accepted or discredited. 
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It is patent that if PAS is going to continue to be employed in custody 
and access cases there should be a degree of uniformity in its judicial treatment. 
To determine what this treatment should entail, several issues must be 
discussed. First, a discussion of the origins and general symptomology of PAS 
must be described. Second, a careful examination of the controversy forestalling 
acceptance of the syndrome. This background can then be used to examine how 
PAS has been treated in the legal sphere and lead finally to the relevance of 
PAS to access and custody litigation in New Zealand. 
II PAS-A BACKGROUND 
The Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is regarded as a phenomena of 
post-separation conflict. In basic terms it describes a situation in which a child 
refuses contact with the non-custodial parent (the target parent), due to a 
strongly felt fear or hatred of that parent. Upon closer examination however, it 
is revealed that this negative perception is poorly founded and that the child's 
wishes are merely a response to a campaign of deprecation orchestrated by the 
custodial (alienating) parent. 
A PAS Defined 
Richard Gardner, a child psychologist, is credited with the discovery of 
PAS. In 1985 he noted the aspects of the syndrome while he was working on 
custody cases concerning false allegations of child abuse. 1 Earlier researchers 
had noted similar patterns of behaviour.2 Professionals involved in custody 
disputes embraced the designation of this syndrome, recognizing PAS as a 
refinement on a group of events previously regarded as parental ' brainwashing'. 
1 Richard Gardner "Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation" (1985) American Academy of 
Psychoanalysis. <http://www.rgardner.com/refs> (last accessed 15 July 2002) 
2 For example, the medea complex described by Wal lerstein and Kelly in the late 1970s 
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Parental Alienation Syndrome, as Gardner describes it, is a childhood 
disorder that arises almost exclusively in the context of custody disputes. Its 
primary manifestation is a child's campaign of unfair criticism against one 
parent. It is brought on by the indoctrinating behaviour of the alienating parent. 
The behaviour of the alienating parent may range from negative and influencing 
comments about how hurtful it is when the child enjoys time in the other 
parent's company, to extreme cases involving falsified allegations of neglect or 
abuse. It is important here to note that when true parental abuse or neglect is 
present, the child's animosity will be justified; therefore PAS will not be a 
relevant consideration. A PAS child will have complaints that are directly at 
variance with the child's previous experiences; conversely a child who has 
been neglected or abused would have a reason to attack or avoid their abuser. 
The key in determining the existence of PAS is the recognition that the child's 
aversion to the alienated parent is completely without justification. 
The following 6 symptoms proposed by Byme3 appear to be those most 
widely accepted by courts and practitioners as indicators of PAS, and have been 
included in both the reference works Family Law in New Zealand\ and in the 
Australian Publication Expert Evidence5: 
1) The child shows a complex lack of ambivalence. One parent is described almost 
entirely negatively, the other almost entirely positively; 
2) The reasons given for the child's dislike of one parent may appear to be justified 
but investigation shows them to be flimsy and exaggerated; 
3) The child proffers the opinion of wanting less contact with one parent in a way that 
requires little or no prompting. The complaints have a quality of being rehearsed 
or practised; 
4) The child seems to show little or no concern for the feelings of the parent being 
complained about; 
3 Kenneth Byrne "Brainwashing in Custody Cases: The Parental Alienation Syndrome" 
( 1989) 4(3) Australian F Lawyer 1, 4. 
4Dick Webb and others Family Law in New Zealand vol 1 (3 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 483. 
5 Ian Freckelton and Hugh Selby Expert Evidence (loseleaf, The Law Book Company, Sydney, 
I 993)para 13 .395 (last updated July 2002) 
5) The alienating parent, while seemingly acting in the best interests of the children, 
is actually working to destroy the relationship between them and the other parent. 
Jt is not uncommon for this to be further fuelled by new spouses or de factos; 
6) While the child will verbally denigrate one parent, he retains an unspoken 
closeness and affection for that parent. However, if the syndrome is allowed to 
develop unchecked, this can be all but erased by the alienating parent. 
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In New Zealand, Gardner's expanded version of the above symptoms involving 
14 criteria, as complied by Dunne and Hendrick, has also been used.6 
To understand how PAS might affect a child is relatively intuitive. 
Children are generally eager to please their parents - particularly those whom 
6 Dunne and Hedrick "The Parental Alienation Syndrome: An analysis of sixteen selected cases" 
(1994) 21 J Divorce Remarriage 24, 33. 
I. Child is preoccupied with depreciation and criticism of the parent that is 
unjustified and/or exaggerated. 
2. Conscious, subconscious, and unconscious factors within the alienating 
parent contribute to the child's alienation from the other. 
3. Denigration of the parent has the quality ofa litany, a rehearsed quality. 
There is phraseology not usually used by the child. 
4. Child justifies the alienation with memories of minor altercations 
experienced in the relationship with the parent which are trivial and which 
most children would have forgotten. When asked, the child is unable to 
give more compelling reasons. 
5. The alienating parent will concur with the children and support their belief 
that these reasons justify the alienation. 
6. Hatred of the parent is most intense when the alienating parent and the child 
are in the presence of the alienated parent. However, when the child is alone 
with the alienated parent, the child may exhibit hatred, neutrality, or 
expressions of affection. 
7. If the child begins to enjoy him/herself with the alienated parent, there may 
be episodes of "stiffening up" and resuming withdrawal and animosity, as 
though they have done something wrong. Alternatively, the child may ask 
the alienated parent not to reveal his/her affection to the other parent. 
8. The degree of animosity in the child's behaviour and verbalizations may 
vary with the degree of proximity to the alienating parent. 
9. Hatred of the parent often extends to include the alienated parent's extended 
family, with even less justification by the child. 
I 0. The alienating parent is generally unconcerned with the psychological 
effects on the child of the rejection of parent and extended family. 
11. The child's hatred of the alienated parent is often impervious to evidence 
which contradicts his/her position. 
12. The child's position seemingly lacks ambivalence. The alienated parent is 
"all bad," the alienating parent is "all good." 
13. The child is apt to exhibit a guiltless disregard for the feelings of the 
alienated parent. 
14. The child fears the loss of the love of the alienating parent. 
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the child may (rightly) feel are dependent on them. In this endeavour, they are 
attuned to any small desire the parent might express, including that for 
solidarity against a common enemy. Both conscious and subconscious efforts 
of the custodial (alienating) parent will affect the child's perception of their 
relationship and loyalty to the non-custodial parent. From these instinctive 
feelings, the alienating parent might begin a pattern of criticism with the child 
in a number of ways. One technique plays on the emerging psyche of children 
already struggling to differentiate between reality and 'make-believe': 
generalizing one or two instances of conflict into a global experience.7 For 
example, the child might be reminded of a time when mother was cross with 
him (justifiably) but the memory is generalised as part of a bigger conclusion: 
"Mum is really out of control - you know how she yells at you all the time." 
Once a pattern of criticism is established, PAS children frequently add their 
own scenarios to the campaign as they recognise, in a Skinnerian conditioning 
sense, that their complementary contributions are desired and rewarded. 
Although many children - even the very young - can differentiate between the 
truth and a lie, their memory and more importantly their view of the world is 
easily influenced. 
Mia Kelmer Pringle stated in her 1975 study that children are aided in 
life by knowing what is expected of them, what the rules are, and whether these 
are in their interests or in the interests of others.8 The rules for a child affected 
by PAS seem to be that love is contingent on their acquiescence regarding, or 
active participation in, the denigration of the target parent. In this, the child 
further loses the sense of whose interest they are serving, mistaking their own 
desires for those of the parent who they want to appease. This pattern becomes 
self-reinforcing and the result is a spiralling campaign: 9 As the child is allowed 
7 A list of techniques such as generalization can be found in Kenneth H Waldron, David E Joanis 
"Understanding and Collaboratively Treating Parental Alienation Syndrome" ( 1996) I O American JFL 
121. 
8 Mia Kellmer Pringle The Needs of Children (Hutchinson, New York, 1975) 151. 
9 Kenneth H Waldron and David E Joanis "Understanding and Collaboratively Treating Parental 
Alienation Syndrome" (1996) 10 American JFL 121, 121. 
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to avoid contact, the avoidance becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: the child 
begins to see the absent parent as a disagreeable stranger. 
The psychological damage to a PAS child is threefold: their beliefs and 
ordinary attachments are being manipulated by the alienating parent; their 
psychological bond with the other parent is being disrupted; and most 
disconcerting is that they begin to believe the allegations they themselves make. 
This belief in their own falsified allegations creates what is often referred to as 
afolie a deu.x, where the child and the alienating parent both operate under the 
delusion that the negative traits of the target parent are indeed real. 
B PAS Solutions 
In an extreme situation of PAS Gardner suggests a complete reversal of 
custody in order to break the psychological pattern. Gardner has emphasised 
that a parent who promotes such a negative pattern of behaviour in their child is 
perpetrating a form of emotional abuse, the result of which might "not only 
produce lifelong alienation from a loving parent but a lifelong psychiatric 
disturbance in the child." 10 It is evident that a parent who cultivates a falsified 
hatred in their child has, at best, a complete disregard for the value of the other 
parent's role in child rearing and that, at the very least, this influence should be 
modified. In New Zealand, although it is preferable to maintain some kind of 
routine for children with separated parents there is no presumption in 
continuing whatever routine that might be. 11 On the other hand, if the child's 
aversion to the target parent is indeed justified, a dramatic change in custody 
has the potential to be traumatic. 
10 Richard Gardner, The Parental Alie11atio11 Syndrome 2"d ed. (Creative Therapeutics, Cresskill, New 
Jersey, 1987) xxi. 
11 Clapham v Clapham [ 1993] NZFLR 408. 
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A panel of experts involved in the NZLS Seminar on Family law and the 
rights of children and youth 12 suggested alternatives to a custody swap as 
remedies to Parental Alienation (syndrome). 13 The panel felt that as the 
behaviour of the alienating parent is what primarily aligns the child, 
modification of that behaviour is the first step in halting the cycle. Simply 
removing the child from custody it was felt, was not the preferred option and at 
the very least should not be the lone solution. 
The Panel suggested that orders should include healing steps from as 
early on in the conflict as possible, including an attempt to keep lawyers from 
getting overly adversarial and therefore exacerbating the alignment. At trial, 
counsel for the child and an impartial court appointed expert would aid in this. 
In terms of orders made by the finder of fact, it seems obvious that the child, 
who has now been recognised as a victim of emotional abuse, should be given 
some sort of ongoing counselling. Education, and child parenting classes 
including education about the needs of the child, were suggested for both the 
alienating and target parents. If possible it was encouraged for either the 
psychological expert or the judge to develop a behavioural plan to intervene in 
the alienation process. Such a plan would include such things as permitting 
access for a period of time, not making any disparaging remarks about the other 
parent for a period of time, and actively encouraging the child to make positive 
remarks about time spent with the target parent. 14 Emphasised as crucial by the 
panel was the fact that any plan must be followed through with teeth from the 
court. 15 Warrants to enforce access might have been envisaged. The custody 
swap is reserved, even by Gardner, for the most serious of cases. A more 
measured approach would be to reintroduce the target parent slowly, and allow 
12 Joan Kelly "Family Law and the Rights of Children and Youth"( ZLS seminar, Auckland, 
September 1997) 21 7. 
13 The focus was on 'Parental Alienation' but it is clear that the syndrome was intended. 
14 Kelly, above, 217. 
15 Joan Kelly "Family Law and the Rights of Children and Youth"(NZLS seminar, Auckland, 
September 1997) 217. 
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the child time to re-develop the relationship with the target parent within an 
organised and supportive framework. 
C Introductory Summary 
Parental Alienation Syndrome has been outlined and studied in a 
rudimentary manner, with various similar hypotheses of symptoms and 
treatment emerging. Many courts in various jurisdictions have responded to 
this and allowed argument based on PAS. However, for every similarity and 
congruence of thought, there is an equal and opposite contention. This is the 
reason that PAS has not gained complete and full acceptance. Some criticisms 
of PAS will be discussed in the following section. 
III ARGUMENTS AGAINST PAS 
Parental Alienation Syndrome is a controversial diagnosis, in part 
because it is used in custody litigation where tensions and accusations often run 
high, and any examination of the parties is clouded by circumstance. However, 
several cogent attacks have been launched against the recognition of this 
disorder. The following primary criticisms will be canvassed, and counter 
arguments discussed: First, the contention that Gardner himself as the self-
proclaimed ' founder' of PAS is an imprudent and poorly researched scholar, 
particularly in light of his cavalier attitude towards allegations of abuse. 
Second, the lack of recognition of PAS by the scientific community, which will 
lead to a comparison of another similarly 'unproven' syndrome. Finally, the last 
section will address the criticism that PAS is no more than the ordinary reaction 
of families attempting to cope with separation, to which a confusion within the 
syndrome will be highlighted. 
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A Robert Gardner 
Parental Alienation Syndrome finds both its genesis and its downfall in 
Dr. Gardner. There is much concern that his work has not been peer-reviewed 
and that there has been little research into the psychological issues. Indeed, the 
fact that PAS is a syndrome arising in the context of custody disputes has lead 
to very few articles being written about the subject in non-legal journals. It is 
contended that his discovery of the syndrome was based on a small sample 
from his own practice and his personal observations. Other criticisms include 
that Gardner publishes his own work, and that he is something of a hired gun 
for custody proceedings. Although he maintains that he is not affiliated with 
any advocacy groups, he and his cause have been championed by various 
fathers' associations. This is not surprising as in 1998 he maintained ( after 
nearly 20 years of study) that in 85-90 per cent of the cases he had observed, 
the mother was the alienating parent. Perhaps revealing his limited research 
methods or limited study size however, in 2000 he revised this statement and in 
an addendum to his book noted that the past two years had demonstrated a shift 
that put the gender ratio of alienating parents at 50:50. 16 
Simply because Gardner has debatable history as a researcher, or 
because his research methods are poor, does not mean that PAS itself should be 
dismissed. Other professionals at other times have recognised similar patterns 
of behaviour - and others have conducted more thorough inquiries. Whether or 
not the syndrome exists in the exact form that Gardner states is less important 
than recognising that there is an undeniable similarity in alleged PAS cases. If 
the syndrome is to be discredited, it must be on a stronger basis than that its 
founder was poor at formulating. 
16 Basic Facts about the Parental Alienation Syndrome <http: //www.rgardner.com/refs> (last accessed 
15 July 2002) 
10 
I PAS and abuse 
A specific complaint with PAS is that it acts as a counter to allegations 
of abuse, and that a successful contention of the syndrome could result in 
custody decisions adverse to a child's welfare. There is a concern that where 
valid allegations of physical or sexual abuse are made, a successful argument of 
PAS will put an abuser back into contact with the victimised child. Gardner has 
been somewhat cavalier about statements concerning child abuse stating that 
the "vast majority" of sexual abuse allegations made during custody disputes 
are false. 17 There is a genuine concern that the syndrome as Gardner formulates 
it might place an abused child in the sole custody of the abuser, or even in the 
less extreme, that a clear demonstration of the 'syndrome' will obscure the fact 
that the child has a legitimate reason to avoid contact. Along this vein is 
Gardner's suggestion that a severe case of PAS warrants a complete change of 
custody to facilitate the child's 'deprogramming'. In a case of actual abuse 
however, it is evident that such a drastic measure will result in the worst of 
consequences: not only will the child be placed into the care of the abuser, but 
they will be cut off from the only other adult who might act as protector. 
B PAS and the Scientific Community 
It is suggested that expert testimony based on PAS lacks an adequate 
scientific foundation for admissibility and that it oversimplifies the aetiology of 
the symptoms it includes. 18 Part of this problem lies in the fact that the 
syndrome is not rigorously defined. The form of PAS originally tendered by 
Gardner was one specifically related to false allegations of sexual abuse. 
However, it has slowly come to encompass all situations where a child resists 
access. The problem with research in this area is that only recently have studies 
emerged comparing children of divorce to a control group of children in intact 
17 Kathleen Colbem Faller "The Parental Alienation Syndrome - What is It and What Data Support 
It?" (1998) 3 Child Maltreatment 98, 103. 
18 Richard Warshak "Remarriage As A Trigger Of Parental Alienation Syndrome" (2000) 28 
American JF Therapy 2, 29. 
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families. It is unhelpful that studies continue to be conducted on children in the 
custody of their mothers and visiting their fathers - which is a substantial 
deficiency. 19 Also noted is that these kinds of studies are necessarily voluntary 
and are generally conducted on white upper middle class families. While 
increased study and improved formulations of the syndrome should be 
welcomed, poor quality of study has lead to misleading conclusions and 
imprecision in diagnosis. Kelly and Johnston20 have promoted a view of the 
syndrome that extends the causative factors to include both those within the 
child and within the alienating parent. Cartwright21 widens the inquiry, 
postulating that persons other than the parents can be responsible for alienation. 
There seem to be many theories that extend from Gardner's PAS but few that 
attempt to refine and consolidate it. 
1 The DSM-IV and ICD-10 
When courts have refused to admit testimony on PAS the reason cited 
has often been related to its non-acceptance by the scientific community. The 
standard for such acceptance is the inclusion within a catalogue of disorders 
such as either the World Health Organisation's ICD-10 or the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders (DSM-IV). Neither of these contain 
a listing on PAS. Further, according to the chair of the American Psychiatric 
Association's DSM-IV work group on 'Disorders Usually First Diagnosed 
During Infancy, Childhood or Adolescence', PAS has not been proposed to any 
DSM committee.22 
19 Joan Kelly " Family Law and the Rights of Children and Youth"(NZLS seminar, Auckland, 
September 1997) 212. 
20 J8 Kelly and JR Johnston "The Alienated Child: A reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome" 
(2001) 39 F Court Rev 249. 
21 GF Cartwright "Expanding the Parameters of Parent Alienation Syndrome" (1993) 27 American JF 
Therapy 205. 
22 Richard Warshak "Remarriage As A Trigger Of Parental Alienation Syndrome" (2000) 28 American 
JF Therapy 2, 29. 
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The counter to these arguments is that PAS does exist, whether it is 
recognised or not. It is noted that many syndromes take time to work 
themselves into the catalogues, and often require pressure from lobby groups 
for acceptance. Additionally, other syndromes, although unrecognised by the 
DSM-IV, are accepted in courts of law.23 Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS) 
is the prime example - well known and widely used as a partial defence in 
several jurisdictions, but not listed in the DSM-IV. Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (previously syndrome) is another example which was only formally 
recognised recently. For the two above conditions, and arguably for PAS, even 
without professional vetting, clinicians can recognise a predictable symptom 
pattern which, while perhaps not 'official', can aid in courtroom findings. 
2 PAS, B WS, and syndromes in general 
The use and relative level of acceptance for Battered Women's 
Syndrome makes a strong argument for the acceptance of an 'unrecognised' 
syndrome such as PAS. BWS is not recognised in the DSM-IV or ICD-10. As 
is the case with PAS, agreement has not been reached as to whether BWS 
constitutes a distinct psychiatric diagnosis. However, this has not impeded 
clinicians or the legal system from acknowledging that BWS exists, whatever 
weight they might attach to it. 24 Although the theories that underpin both 
syndromes remain uncertain, this is not unconunon for psychiatric disorders. 
Both syndromes have an (arguably) predictable symptom pattern. Another 
factor to consider is the possibility that both will eventually be incorporated 
into one of the mainstream psychiatric classifications. If PAS is regarded as 
being in a process of acceptance then the next step is obviously to clarify and 
refine the definition of the syndrome in order to speed that acceptance and to 
make best use of it now. 
23 Tony Hobbs" Parental Alienation Syndrome and UK Family Courts, Part I" [2002] Family L 182, 
185. 
24 Hobbs, above I 85. 
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Neither of the syndromes have been corroborated by rigorous scientific 
testing and yet BWS's existence is not in question. In many ways it would be 
unethical to scientifically test for the effects of domestic abuse25 as it would be 
to test brainwashing by parents. Certainly, further study of divorcing families 
could be undertaken - but as with many of these voluntary studies it is unlikely 
that an appropriate cross section would volunteer as subjects. 
Waiting on scientific testing may indeed be unnecessary. In general, 
psychological expertise is principally based on clinical experience rather than 
on theories subject to scientific testing. Therefore for both PAS and BWS it 
may be enough for an expert to detail what he believes in a certain case rather 
than waiting for the academic literature to amass. 
One criticism levelled against PAS is its stated aetiology: that the 
symptoms are caused almost exclusively by the alienating parent. Yet research 
in this area shows that in high-conflict divorces many parents engage m 
indoctrinating behaviours and relatively few children become alienated; 
"[h Jenee, alienating behaviour by a parent is neither a sufficient or necessary 
condition for a child to become alienated."26 In much the same way, there are 
many battering relationships where battered women do not attack their partners 
with lethal force. Indeed one necessary condition for the syndrome - learned 
helplessness - would actually suggest that these women would be the least 
likely to act out. What causes a woman to 'snap ' or a child to become alienated 
is certainly due to some indefinable internal factor but arguably neither would 
be triggered without the external pressures of high-conflict relationship 
breakdowns or battering relationships. 
Part of the concern in using either of these syndromes judicially is that 
legal tests are premised on requirements which are difficult to satisfy in every 
25 Elisabeth McDonald " No Defense of Battered Women's syndrome" (1998) 507 Law Talk 33 , 33 . 
26 JB Kelly and Johnston JR " The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation 
Syndrome" (200 I) 39 F Court Rev 249, 253 . 
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case, for instance: the imminence of harm and necessity requisite for BWS, or 
perhaps with PAS: the evidence of programming. Another danger in 
attempting to use either syndrome in the courts is the concern that such use will 
further pathologise and medicalise the behaviour of abused women and abused 
children. The standard established by the syndrome - for instance: 'learned 
helplessness' or a 'campaign of denigration' is a standard for the ideal 
candidate, but these standards can not properly accommodate those who do not 
exhibit the requisite symptoms on a regular basis. 27 
There is a danger that in being too closely defined a syndrome will come 
to be too rigidly applied by the courts. It is a bizarre fate of 'syndromes' that 
they must first be medicalised to gain acceptance, and then demedicalised by 
dropping the title 'syndrome' to allow expert explanations in terms of practical 
reality rather than individual pathology. This has been, in many ways, the route 
taken by BWS. As Justice Thomas stated in Ruka28 
while the syndrome represents an acute form of the battering relationship ... it is 
probably preferable to speak simply of the battering relationship and its effects on 
the mind and the will of women in such relationships ... it is not, therefore simply a 
matter of ascertaining whether a woman is suffering from battered women's 
syndrome and, if so, treat that as an exculpatory factor. What is important is that 
the evidence establish that the battered woman is suffering from symptoms or 
characteristics which are relevant to the particular case. 
If PAS were to follow BWS' s lead, it seems that reducing the syndrome 
to a series of symptoms and requirements to 'tick' would be of minimal value 
since the real issues will eventually return to wider considerations of what is 
fair and just, having regard to the peculiarities of the particular case. To echo 
the above judgement, it is not a matter of ascertaining whether the child is 
suffering from PAS, but that in suffering, the child is increasingly unable to see 
where their interests or welfare lies. Seeing PAS in the context of the entire 
27 McDonald , above, 34. 
28 Ruka v DSW [ 1997] I NZLR 154, 173 (HC) Thomas J. 
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case will further help to determine what is right for this child in this set of 
circumstances, taking into consideration the effect of PAS. 
C PAS as Part of the Break-up 
One explanation for alienation is that family systems simply change 
upon family break-up. A new system means some adjustment and possibly 
some sadness. Changes or interruptions to the family unit, cause children in 
particular to recognise their own vulnerability and the fragility of their 
relationships. 29 A host of responses to these feelings can be brought out in a 
child depending on their age and maturity. One study noted that the age and 
developmental stage of children played a major role in their reaction to parental 
separation - of particular note to this discussion was the reaction of 9 - 10 year 
olds who tended to openly express anger and to commonly align with one 
parent against the other.30 A more recent study undertaken by Johnston31 found 
that refusals of visitation appeared frequently in high-conflict custody disputes 
with three-fourths of children of the 9 - 12 age group, in alignments more than 
two to three years post separation. It is also important to note that a child's 
primary attachment can alternate between parents at different stages of 
development, and that their inherited personality characteristics may well make 
them feel more affinity for one parent than the other at any given time.32 An 
explanation for what is seen as PAS then might really be no more than a natural 
insecurity on the part of the child when faced with certain circumstantial and 
developmental factors. 
29 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (Harper and Rowe, Chicago, 
1973) 18. 
30 J Wallerstein and J Kelly " The Effects of Parental Divorce" ( 1975) 14 J American Academy Child 
Psychiatry 600, 614. 
31 Janet R Johnston "Children of Divorce Who Refuse Visitation" in Charlene E Depner and James H 
Bray (eds) Nonresidential Parenting (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, California, 1993) 120, 124. 
32 Dick Webb and others Family Law in NZ Tenth Edition vol l(Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 465 
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As a group, children of divorce do have a lower level of well-being as 
measured by psychological adjustment measures.33 Individual differences may 
seem small, but significant statistical differences of divorced children and in-
tact families have shown children of divorce to have "more aggressive acting-
out behaviours, impulsive and anti-social behaviours, more problems with 
relationships with their parents, more negative self-concepts and more academic 
achievement problems."34 Therefore, much of what might appear symptomatic 
of PAS is also symptomatic of divorce. Children of a high conflict marriage 
which has ended in separation are likely to have observed hostile interactions 
between their parents. It is not surprising then to see these behaviours 
incorporated into the child's personal repertoire of conduct.35 There may be no 
need for the alienating parent to brainwash a child as they are already primed to 
act out and to deal with the target parent in the same way they have seen them 
dealt with in the past. 
1 Justified alienation 
Ongoing parental acnmony, especially when associated with physical 
violence, could lead to justified alienation. Some behaviours such as narcissism, 
alcoholism, and other antisocial tendencies when exhibited by a parent would 
be alienating in any marital context. Parents who embroil their children in the 
middle of their conflict in particular affect the adjustment of the child to the 
divorce situation. An American study36 investigating the way parents involve 
their children in their separation has a noticeable similarity to some of the 
factors recognised as symptoms of PAS: 
33 Joan Kelly "Family Law and the Rights of Children and Youth"(NZLS seminar, Auckland, 
September 1997) 212 
34 Kelly, above, 212. 
35 Kelly, above, 213 . 
36 Buchanan, Dornvosh, McCobity as quoted in L Trinder "Competing constructions of childhood: 
children's rights and children's wishes in divorce" (1997) 19 J Social Welfare FL 291,301. 
I) Children asked to carry a hostile message to the other parent: "Tell your 
mother I'm not buying you those shoes because I already sent her plenty of money, 
I don't know what she does with it" (this may affect the child's perception of the 
target parent) 
2) Children asked intrusive questions about the other parent: "Where did Mum's 
boyfriend sleep this weekend?" (this may cause the child to question the actions 
of their caregiver) 
3) Creating in the child a need to hide information about the other parent and 
thus compartmentalize their lives (this could explain the child more closely 
identifying with that one relationship that is more constant - the bigger 
compartment) 
4) Creating in the child a need to hide their feelings about the other parent (a 
sense that it will not be acceptable for the child to return from access and say that 
he or she had a nice time, or to say " I love Mum, can I go see her for a few 
hours?") 
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Parents who cannot distance their children from their own anxieties 
about separation certainly do them a disservice, but it would be ridiculous if 
such a common wrong was then termed a medical syndrome. 
2 Parental Alienation and PAS 
Taking into account normal reactions to separation, it is evident that 
many familiar parental behaviours can elicit an alienated reaction. A child 
might become alienated because of feelings of abandonment, because of 
frustration at a change in routine or because the child is angry at the parent who 
initiated the divorce. Further, alienating a parent may be the way a child 
attempts to exercise control over the situation, or the way feelings of confusion 
can be expressed. Neither of these behaviours can justifiably be considered 
PAS.37 'Parental Alienation' is a general designation. PAS, by contrast is a 
very specific subtype of parental alienation which, as detailed above, involves 
both the child and a parent in active, unfounded denigration of the target parent. 
37 Richard Gardner "The Parental Alienation Syndrome"<http://www.rgardner.com/refs> (last 
accessed 15 July 2002) 
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PAS is meant to go much further than any ordinary alignment or affinity. 
Darnell, defines 'Parental Alienation' as "any constellation of behaviours, 
whether conscious or unconscious, that could evoke a disturbance in the 
relationship between a child and a targeted parent."38 This imprecise definition 
defines behaviour, but could not define a syndrome 
In a case where PAS is at issue, other alienating factors may remove the 
court's focus from the alienator and redirect attention to what might be only 
minor parental deficiencies exhibited by the target parent. Using the term PAS 
in an inappropriate context both dilutes the meaning of the syndrome and calls 
its validity into question. Certainly there is nothing unusual about a child 
clinging to the parent with whom he or she has most contact - but to conclude 
that this is PAS without more evidence would be irresponsible, both as regards 
the parties and as regards the diagnosis. 
Another possibility is that desperate parents in a particularly difficult 
divorce may falsely allege abuse or neglect on the part of one parent. In a tit for 
tat kind of way PAS offers a counter - instead of denial the other parent can be 
on the offensive, alleging a different kind of abuse which is just as difficult to 
prove. The line between accidentally involving a child in the separation, and 
using that separation to alter the child is a fine one. While the courts contend 
with two falsified claims, the fate of PAS as a diagnosis may be called into 
dispute. 
Any tool that is used to determine PAS in the courts then will need to be 
flexible enough to differentiate between nom1al alienated responses to divorce, 
alienated responses arising out of something more sinister than divorce, and 
alienated responses arising out of PAS. 
38 D Darnell "Parental Alienation: Not in the Best Interests of the Children" (1999) 75 orth Dakota L 
Rev 323, 329. 
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D Criticisms in Summary 
Without further investigation it is impossible to state whether PAS is 
valid and therefore should be accepted in a court of law. However, none of the 
criticisms levelled against PAS are without their counter: Discredit of the 
syndrome does not necessarily follow from discredit of its pioneering founder; 
Scientific acceptance of the syndrome is important, but in light of the 
recognition of BWS, exclusion from reference tombs is not insurmountable; 
Finally, the similarity between PAS and ordinary alienating processes requires 
care in investigation, which should be the objective in any case. 
If a court is prepared to hear argument on PAS, and make judgements 
based on its effect, then the finder of fact must also be prepared to accept it in 
light of all the arguments detailed above. Fortunately this endeavour is not one 
that a Judge has to undertake alone. As outlined in the following section, 
experts in the field will also aid in deciding how to utilise PAS in the court. 
IV FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 
PAS requires Judges and lawyers to deal with the difficult task of 
evaluating the mental state of a child and their interactions with family. This is 
not strictly a legal professional's area of expertise. The realm of forensic 
psychiatry allows opinion of an expert in the area of disorders of the mind to 
inform a legal determination.39 
A Law v Medicine 
The number of possible syndromes, their corresponding symptomology, 
and theoretical bases require constant scrutiny in order to chart modifications 
and extensions. That scrutiny must be done by one who can devote a substantial 
amount of time to understanding those developments. Without this expert, the 
39 Alan P Wilkinson "Forensic Psychiatry: the Making- and Breaking - of Expert Opinion Testimony" 
[1997] J Psychiatry L 51, 53. 
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nature of case law is such that changes may occur in a line of diagnosis before 
the law has had time to directly consider a given issue at all. Additionally, 
many clinical and therapeutic tests do not map well onto the legal/ forensic 
arena.40 The medical field is concerned with treatment, the legal with facts. If 
some treatment course might work, based on some evidence, a clinician may 
initiate it. A legal determination requires much more certainty. In a legal 
forum, the pathologisation of a set of circumstances by the mention of tests; 
statistical analysis; and the daunting terms: 'syndrome' and 'disorder' may 
appear as absolute facts, obscuring behaviours' merely hypothetical basis. 
Currently, without recognition m the DSM or ICD, PAS must be 
recognised by medical and legal personnel as a non-diagnostic syndrome with 
no clearly verified pattern, cause, or treatment. However, as discussed above, 
even disorders included in the DSM have often undefined patterns, origin, and 
effects. Even when a syndrome is accepted, it represents only a "common 
denominator of the most frequently observed ... behaviours."41 As discussed 
above an individual's behaviour may not fit neatly into the class of behaviours 
'most frequently observed' and without some adjustment might fall outside 
both legal and mental health categories. 
B The Bias Of The Unbiased Expert 
Section 29A of the Guardianship Act, and section 178 of the Children 
Young Persons and Families Act42 provide for the appointment of a neutral 
expert to give opinion on the medical and psychological status of the parties 
involved in a custody dispute. This is well as the nature of forensic psychiatry is 
not the same as clinical psychiatry: "In a therapist empathy is good, in an 
40 Jan Freckelton "Evaluating Parental Alienation and Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 
Evidence" (2002) Butterworths FLJ 57,57. 
41 RC Summit "The Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syndrome" ( 1983) 7 Child Abuse and Neglect 
177, 180. 
42 to be discussed in section YI 
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evaluator it may be an impediment to accuracy and objectivity."43 However, it 
is the nature of the legal atmosphere that even the most neutral expert will be 
tempted to frame opinions in the most persuasive way possible. Once a 
decision is made on the existence or absence of PAS it will be inevitable that 
the expert will want to ensure that justice is done for the child. Inevitably a 
determination on PAS will favour one party or another in a custody or access 
case, in this way it may be a concern that "altruism strengthens partisanship and 
objectivity suffers."44 
It must be recognised that even a neutral expert is not plucked from 
some uniform stock of experts. The nature of psychiatry is that it is the realm of 
the educated guess, and further the guess of an expert who may be informed by 
any range of factors. As Newman states: "expert witnesses make choices about 
which psychological theories and tactics to believe in and practice, ... theoretical 
orientations and beliefs vitally influence expert's recommendations."45 One 
simple example of a neutral expert's theoretical bias might be their belief as to 
whether to match a child with a parent by gender. While this would not be a 
legally acceptable basis on which to make a determination, it may be made 
nonetheless under the guise of expert opinion. In addition, since forensic 
psychiatry is not a strictly therapeutic endeavour, unless the expert continues on 
as therapist for the parties it may never become apparent as to how their prior 
recommendations have fared. Thus a therapist could conceivably make 
incorrect determination after incorrect determination ( of PAS for example) and 
become entrenched in a flawed line of analysis. 
C Evaluation 
In cases involving children, the integrity of the fact finding process 
gains an extended significance. There is arguably even less room for error. 
43 Stephen Newman "Assessing The Quality Of Expert Testimony In Cases Involving Children" 
[1994] Jof Psychiatry and L 181,216. 
44 Newman, above, 204. 
45 Newman, above, 189. 
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Therefore it must be made clear that the expert has enough time and experience 
to truly determine whether a syndrome such as PAS is a factor. There is the 
danger that a neutral expert, who may not have had ongoing interaction with the 
child, will not have the time to examine the situation carefully. A brief 
evaluation made expressly for the legal proceedings may "overemphasise first 
impressions, and produce poorly substantiated conclusions."46 A similar error 
that the fact-finder must be wary of is the 'snapshot effect' where a brief look at 
a family may be based on behaviours and moods that later change. Parents in a 
custody battle in particular may behave atypically badly or atypically well in 
the evaluation process. Newman notes: "as their anxiety increases, parents may 
lie, become provocative and insulting, or even appear close to psychosis. On the 
other hand some parents handle the anxiety with denial and seem to be 
reasonable or calm."47 One would hope that a professional in this field would 
be alert to the perils of incomplete analysis. However, factors such as time 
constraints and the calculated avoidance of assessment by both parents and 
children may make extended evaluations impossible. The finder of fact should 
be aware of such dangers and prepared to question whether they exist. 
D Temptation to Defer 
Evidence of 'specialized knowledge' only permits an expert to testify as 
to personal expertise, observation, and skill. It is for the finder of fact to weigh 
the evidence. There is concern however, that in a situation where the 
specialized knowledge of children, relationships, or psychology in general is so 
far beyond the expertise of the Judge that it will be tempting to simply defer, 
blindly trusting in the expert's evidence as fact. A medical diagnosis, however 
uncertain, may have the right resonance of integrity. This is not acceptable. A 
judge should feel free to take an expert's advice but to also take into 
46 Michael Gunter" Induction, Identification or Folie a Deux? Psychodynamics and Genesis of 
Munchausen Syndromes By Proxy and False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Adolescents" ( 1998) 17 
Med L 359, 369. 
47 Stephen Newman "Assessing The Quality Of Expert Testimony In Cases Involving Children" 
[1994) JofPsychiatry and L 181, 187. 
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consideration that, particularly in the case of syndromes, diagnosis may be 
based on theoretical preferences, or beliefs derived from the expert's unique set 
of past clinical cases, and may not reflect the accepted practice or wisdom of a 
body of practitioners. A fact finder should not be under the misapprehension 
that 'clinical opinion' has the purity or force of a scientifically tested theory 
behind it. Ian Freckelton takes account of all of this in his recent statement 
that: 48 
It is important that decision makers bring . . . a healthy preparedness to question 
assumptions and contentions. It is likewise important that advocates facilitate 
the capacity of decision makers to evaluate the probative value of fads and new 
theories by assisting courts to test rigorously the bases, reasoning processes and 
opinions of experts. 
It is the court's obligation to come to a decision on the whole of the evidence, 
including the statements of the parties and, where possible, on the basis of 
discussion with the child. The views of the experts must play their part but 
finally the court has to decide the issue for itself based on the paramount 
consideration of the child's well-being and views. If all of the evidence leads 
the court to a view which is different from that of the expert, or if the 
requirements of the law dictate an alternative conclusion, that conclusion is the 
court's duty to express. Stephen Newman suggests that: 49 
It is well to remember that even in the modem age, the ideal decision maker in 
family matters is not the scientist, but the wise man. It is not the knowledge 
of an Einstein or a Freud that we desire in the most troublesome cases, but the 
wisdom of a Solomon. 
E PAS or Parental Alienation? 
The difficulty with syndrome evidence, and particularly disputed 
syndrome evidence, is that it is very easy to argue that the theory has been 
discredited or that the condition has never existed. It may be possible to attack 
48 Ian Freckelton "Evaluating Parental Alienation and Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Evidence" 
(2002) 4 Butterwo1ihs FLJ 57, 64. 
49 Stephen Newman "Assessing The Quality Of Expert Testimony In Cases Involving Children" 
[1994] Jof Psychiatry and L 181, 183 . 
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the probative value of PAS evidence for the reasons discussed above, most 
notably because it is not empirically supported. However if the issue of PAS 
needs to be raised, that debate must be confronted. One commentator 
suggests:50 
When considering the theory of expert testimony ... it is vitally important to 
avoid confusion engendered by reference to syndromes .... Use of the word 
syndrome leads only to confusion and to unwarranted and unworkable 
comparisons ... The best course is to avoid any mention of syndromes. 
It appears that the issue of 'Parental Alienation' might be raised where it is felt 
that PAS would be too contentious. This course allows counsel, the report 
writer and the fact finder to sidestep inquiries into the syndrome's validity. 
There is a danger in faint-heartedness at this late stage. If a belief in PAS is 
genuinely held, the word syndrome should not be omitted. As noted above, 
such an omission may dilute acceptance and recognition of the true syndrome. 
If parental alienation encompasses both general situations of alienation and the 
specific situation of PAS it is inevitable that the definition of PAS will further 
blur. If the syndrome is valid, clinicians and legal personnel have an obligation 
not to confuse or obscure it. In a true instance of Battered Women's Syndrome, 
the 'syndrome' is not dropped in order to avoid potentially difficult questions. 
Only when such questions are competently met will PAS gain acceptance in the 
legal community. 
F Section Summary 
The evidence of an expert is essential to an investigation of PAS, 
however equally essential is the attention and diligence of the fact finder. 
Syndrome evidence must be recognised as a grey area, and one which by nature 
does not fit well with the law. It must then be dealt with accordingly, without 
numb deference to the expert or avoidance of the issues. 
50 Myers "Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation" [ 1989] Nebraska L Rev 68, 69. 
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V PAS OVERSEAS 
Parental Alienation Syndrome was first noted in 1985. The syndrome is 
no longer novel, however for the reasons canvassed in the previous sections, in 
the context of custody disputes it is far from a known quantity. PAS has been 
considered in many jurisdictions with varying degrees of acknowledgement and 
acceptance. No jurisdiction appears to have a clear plan on how to deal with 
the syndrome when it is raised. The following provides a sample of recent 
developments in various jurisdictions to which ew Zealand courts might look 
for guidance: 
A United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom there is a paucity of case law on PAS and 
research is mainly descriptive. 51 Until the recent case of Re C (Prohibition on 
Further Applications/2 it was not an accepted entity in either the law or in 
psychiatric practice. This case involved an applicant father who alleged PAS in 
respect of his 14 and 15 year old daughters, one of whom had been refusing 
access since the age of I 0. It was decided that a Children and Family Courts 
Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) guardian should be appointed for 
the two children with leave for that guardian to instruct a psychologist. 
Principal Family Court Judge Butler-Sloss then stated that CAFCASS Legal 
should approach such a case: 53 
51 Tony Hobbs "Parental Alienation Syndrome and UK Family Courts - The Dilemma" [2002] Family 
L381,381. 
52 [2002] EWCA Civ 292. 
53 Re C (Prohibition 011 Further Applicatio11s) [2002] EWCA Civ 292 para 13 . 
with a view to looking at the entire family to see whether there is any way out of 
the problems and not to concentrate upon the issue of parental alienation 
syndrome. [PAS] will of course take its place in any consideration but not to 
obscure the other matters that may need to be looked at. 
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While commentators such as Tony Hobbs believe this points to an endorsement 
of PAS, other commentators do not see that as a reasonable conclusion. 
Catherine Williams states that to regard the comments made by Butler-Sloss as 
an acknowledgement of the existence of PAS would be a "very tendentious 
conclusion"54 Williams believes that Butler-Sloss is merely taking note of the 
allegations of the father in this particular case. Hobbs apparently ignores the 
comment made by Butler-Sloss that she "would say to Mr C that his view of the 
significance of parental alienation syndrome may have obscured other more 
obvious indicators that M herself is giving."55 
Of note is the fact that two years prior to the judgment in re C , the most 
prominent decision regarding PAS was that of the Court of Appeal in L v Mand 
H (Children}56 Butler-Sloss also sat on this case and said that: 57 
the existence of the syndrome is not universally accepted. There is , of course, no 
doubt that some parents ... are responsible for alienating their children .. . That 
unhappy state of affairs, well known in the family courts, is a long way from a 
recognised syndrome . .. 
One wonders, in the two years lapse, if the Principal Family Court Judge 
had the change of view on the subject that Hobbs proposes, or if the 
syndrome has earned this new recognition. Like the state of PAS the 
answer to that question is uncertain. 
54 Catherine Williams "Parental Alienation Syndrome" [2002] Family Law 410, 411. 
55 Re C ( Prohibition on Further Applications) [2002] EWCA Civ 292, para 12. 
56 [2000] EWCA Civ 194. 
57 [2000] EWCA Civ 194, 199. 
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B Australia 
Ian Freckelton regards the most significant decision on PAS in 
Australia as the decision by the Federal Court in Johnson v Johnson. 58 This 
decision focussed on whether a parent could raise the issue and call evidence of 
PAS, not on whether it was a valid entity. The symptoms of PAS noted in that 
case draw from the Kenneth Byrne formulation. 59 On the basis of these, the 
court did conclude that PAS "must be a relevant consideration" in cases where 
there were contact difficulties between the parents. In addition, the court had 
" ... no doubt that [PAS was] a very real psychological phenomenon which the 
husband was entitled to investigate"60 
Freckelton is doubtful about the precedential value of this case, and 
appears to think that it sends a misleading message about Australia's acceptance 
of PAS which he feels is far from confirmed.61 
C Europe 
In Europe, Elsholz v German/2 held that a miscarriage of justice had 
occurred in a case where expert evidence and identifiable signs of PAS were 
ignored. Repeated denial of applications for access had lead to an eight year 
lapse in custody of the appellant ' s child. The courts had previously and 
repeatedly reached the conclusion that since the child had adopted his mother's 
objections to his father, this was proof that contact could not be in the interests 
of his well-being. Further, they held that if forced to take up contact contrary to 
his mother's will then the child's development would be endangered.63 
58Johnson v Johnson (7 July 1997) Full Court of Family Court of Australia- as noted in Jan Freckelton 
"Evaluating Parental Alienation and Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Evidence" (2002) 4 
Butterworths FLJ 57, 59. 
59 As described in section II 
60 Johnson v Johnson , above, 59. 
61 Ian Freckelton and Hugh Selby Expert Evidence (looseleaf, The Law Book Company, Sydney, 
1993) para 13 .395 (last updated July 2002) 
62 [2000] 2 FLR 486 
63 [2000] 2 FLR 486, 489. 
28 
Ignorance or aversion to a diagnosis of PAS is obvious. Only after appealing to 
the European Court of Human Rights was it held that the German judiciary had 
" interfered with one of the most fundamental rights, namely, that of respect for 
family lifc"64 and the man was permitted access to hi s children. 
D USA 
The United States, birthplace of PAS and a notorious jurisdiction for 
sensationalized and difficult cu tody di sputes has accepted PAS as a valid 
entity in many jurisdictions.65 Much of the work done on the syndrome in terms 
of psychological studies and legal re earch has come out of America. This docs 
not appear however, to have lead to a unified treatment or re ponse to the 
syndrome. Although accepted, many of the cases mentioning PAS show a lack 
of ri gour, and do not suggest that "anyone - expert, attorney, or judge .. . [have] 
question[ ed] whether the theory is well founded or leads to sound 
recommendations or orders."66 The value of many of the American judgments 
then , is that they at least subject new syndromes to the 'Frye general-
acceptancc-in-a-particular-field-tcst. ' 67 This standard requires that: novel 
technique be accepted by the scientific community as providing a sufficient 
basis for accurate and reliable opinion. Kilgore v Boyd'8recently demonstrated 
that PAS did indeed meet the Frye test standard. The Frye tc t has arguably 
been repl aced by the less ri gorous Daubert69 test, however this, being a lesser 
standard , has no bearing on the acceptance of PAS. 
64 [2000 j 2 FLR 586, 50 I. 
65 Tony I lobbs" Parental Alienation Syndrome and K Fam il y Cou rts, Part I" [2002] FL 182, 185. 
66 Carol S Bruch" Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Ali enation: Getting it Wrong in Chi ld 
Custody ases"(200 I) 35 FL Quarterly 527, 544. 
67 Flye v United States ( 1923) 293 F IOI 3. 
r,x (2000) ircuit ourt of 1311, Judicia l ircuit of State of Florida, I lill sborough ounty, Family law 
divi sion , Case No 990958, Div D. 
69 Daubert v Merrell Dow Phar111aceuticals ( 1993) 125 L Ed 2d 469. The test states that the 
techniques used to gather ex r ert evidence must have been tested, or at least testable and that actua l or 
rotential error rates have been considered. 
29 
E Summary 
While overseas decisions on the existence or validity of PAS may not be 
decisive, New Zealand must be careful to not get out of step with other 
jurisdictions - particularly in the event that PAS is at some point validated by 
inclusion in a compendium such as the DSM. It will be more difficult to justify 
treatment of PAS as merely part of the background if it is recognised as a 
disorder of similar severity to disorders such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
If other legal systems are altering judicial practice to incorporate PAS, New 
Zealand should be careful to continue to modify its own recognition and use of 
the syndrome as well as continuing to question its validity. Perhaps an inquiry 
into the syndrome conducted here would help New Zealand to stay abreast of 
developments and formulate its own plan in light of potentially unique 
situations here. 
VI PAS IN NEW ZEALAND -STATUES 
In New Zealand, the traditional sole-custody-plus-liberal-access 
arrangement is the most common of all care arrangements. Where custody or 
access is at issue, the governing legislation is the Guardianship Act 1968. 
Further, where the child is endangered in some way, The Children Young 
Persons and their Families Act 1993 (CYPF Act) is of use. Both will be 
discussed in tum. In addition, while PAS has the potential to touch on several 
areas of the law, the areas of most interest to this discussion are those related to 
child welfare and the child's wishes, which will also be investigated. 
A Children Young Persons and their Families Act 1993 
The general principle of this act is to promote the well being of children 
and their families, 70which encompasses all aspects of a child and family 
70 Section 4 
30 
group's functioning. By virtue of section six however, the welfare of the child 
is the first and paramount consideration. 
The most significant section of the act is section 14 which questions 
whether the child is 'in need of care and protection' because they are, or are 
likely to be harmed physically, emotionally, or sexually. The 'need' for 
protection is set at a relatively low standard: whether without protection there 
would result "sufficient harm."71 Previous cases have held that exposing a child 
to "the insecurity of life outside the appropriate realms of a 9-year old"72 was 
sufficient emotional harm, as was a situation in which the mother could not 
maintain normal relationships with others.73 Parental alienation syndrome fits 
clearly within the ambit of emotional harm if these cases are any example. 
Surely using a child as a pawn against the other parent in a custody dispute 
could be said to subjecting them to an 'adult situation clearly outside of the 
appropriate realm.' Additionally, although the syndrome 1s not generally 
characterised as a disorder of the parent, the inability to maintain any 
semblance of a normal relationship with the only other central figure in a 
child's life would have an understandably detrimental emotional effect on that 
child, and therefore be rightly termed sufficient emotional harm. 
B Guardianship Act 1968 
The situation in New Zealand as regards custody and access is largely 
governed by the Guardianship Act 1968 (amended 1995). Under section 23(1) 
the court has a plain duty to "regard the welfare of the child as the first and 
paramount consideration". With that overriding thought in mind, the starting 
point of any custody dispute should be, that both parents have equal rights of 
guardianship and that these rights have an entrenched status. 74 
71 D-GSWv S [1992) NZFLR 309, 312 McGechan J 
72 Dick Webb and others Family Law in NZ Tenth Edition Vo/ /(Butterworths, Wellington, 200 I) 
1010. 
73 Re W (5 March 1999) District Court Timaru CYPF 076/36-37/4 Somerville J. 
74 By virtue of sections three, six and I O of the Act. 
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Section 29A of the Guardianship Act allows the court to request an 
independent specialist's report on the child or the family, and is heralded as a 
move away from the strictly adversary system - the specialists are not partisan 
to any of the parties and can allow the welfare of the child to be their guide. A 
similar power is included in section 178 of the CYPF Act. A specialist retained 
under either Act, is particularly valuable in the area of PAS where it is thought 
that an expert obtained by one of the adult parties might not only be biased, but 
is in danger of missing the signs of PAS and being manipulated by the 
alienating parent. Interestingly, although the sections ask for a specialist report 
'on' the child, they do not explicitly require that the child's views be 
ascertained. 
Sexual and physical abuse are dealt with under s 16B, a section which 
provides that even where a parent has conunitted violence or sexual abuse, 
supervised access may still be appropriate. This indicates the importance 
attached to maintaining a relationship with both parents, even in extreme 
circumstances. Naturally however, this section is subject to the overriding best 
interests of the child. The true issue in a custody dispute then, is the degree to 
which the parent's guardianship rights, and the importance of maintaining such 
relationships need to be modified so as to ensure that the child's welfare is 
promoted.75 Judge Inglis in W v C76 has stated that when parents separate, their 
duties remain with the child and that their "primary obligation to their child [is] 
to consider the means by which they can continue to preserve for their child the 
advantages of the joint parenting and nurturing". 
77 
75 Dick Webb and others Family Law in NZ Tenth Edition Vol l(Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 
481. 
76 [2000] NZFLR 4 71. 
77 [2000] NZFLR 471,474. 
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C Wishes of the Child 
A complicating factor in terms of modifying guardianship rights and the 
existence of PAS is the direction in s 23(2) of the Guardianship Act, which 
obliges the court to ascertain the wishes of the child where possible. Wishes 
also enter into the guidance principles in section 5 of the CYPF Act 1989. As 
discussed previously, wishes of a PAS child are likely to be emphatic, and may 
also appear lucid and mature, obscuring the reality of the situation. Fortunately 
under both of the above sections, the court has a wide discretion to decide the 
weight to attach to expressed wishes. Particularly relevant to the PAS situation 
is Judge Inglis' comment that" a child's welfare cannot always responsibly be 
regulated by what the child wants at a particular time"78 appropriately stated in 
a case where an 11 year old's wishes were disregarded because they were 
influenced by strong tension between the parents. 
There is a two-step process regarding the reasonmg process under 
section 23(2): First, to ascertain the wishes of a child. In doing this, the court 
must be alert to influences on those wishes although these will not necessarily 
invalidate the wish. It is noted that all people, not just children, are influenced 
by their surroundings and beliefs in some way. Secondly, the court is to give 
weight to the wishes having regard to the child's age and maturity and overall 
best interests. 79 This second step is in line with ew Zealand's obligations to 
Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 80 
Respecting the child as an active and valid participant in the divorce 
process necessarily involves ascertaining his or her views. This does not mean 
that children must be abandoned to their rights, but respect for the child and 
their view does require that the child be made aware that they have been 
78 Re Hughes (wardship) (21 April 1999) Family Court, Wanganui (FP 083/282/92). 
79 Dick Webb and others Family Law in NZ Tenth Edition Vo/ /(Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 
481. 
80 Article 12 states that a child has the " right to express ... views freely in all matters affecting the child, 
the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child" 
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listened to, and that an explanation is given if their view is not to be given 
effect. 81 Also clear from the Convention is that an obvious interest of the child 
will be to maintain a relationship with both parents.
82 However it is also in that 
child's interest to be protected from abuse - whether alleged physical or alleged 
mental from PAS. 
1 The Trouble With 'Wishes' 
The Children's Issues Centre at the University of Otago has criticised 
the current wording of s 23(2) as archaic, particularly with respect to the use of 
the word 'wishes'. As a future-oriented aspiration, it is argued, the desires that 
the court must have regard to are not "grounded in the current experience and 
concerns of children. Children often "wish" for their parents to get back 
together. .. The difficulty is that once this "wish" is expressed there may be no 
further inquiry into other concerns the child may have."
83 The notion of wish 
also relates to the following complaints: That 'wish ' suggests that the child will 
wish to choose between parents, or that it encourages a "one-off inquiry and 
undermines any idea of an ongoing partnership with the child into their views 
and feelings."84 
The word 'views ' has been suggested by proposed draft legislation as a 
tern1 less laden with the above connotations including issues of preference. 
Also in the draft legislation is a proposal to remove the reference to 'age and 
maturity of the child' as a factor in assessing the weight to be given to wishes 
or views. The concern is that this phrase makes it too easy to dismiss young 
children's views as immature without carefully examining whether the views 
81 Tapp "Use of the UN Convention on the Ri ghts of the Child in the Family Court" in Conference 
Papers - The NZLS family Law Conference ( 1998), 276. 
82 Articles 9 and 8.1 
83 Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin, Family Law Policy in New Zealand (2 ed , Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) 294. 
84 Henaghan and Atkin , above, 294. 
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expressed are in fact significant.85 Perceived maturity should not be allowed to 
eclipse sincerely held views. Freeman emphasises that while children should 
be protected from irrationality in a choice which would undermine future life 
choices or impair interests in an irreparable way, mistakes must be tolerated. In 
order to respect the obligations under the Convention he states: "We would not 
be taking rights seriously if we only respected autonomy when we considered 
the agent was doing the right thing."86 Therefore, the decision to disregard a 
child's wishes should not be related to their maturity per se, but to their 
protection in the case of a choice so irrational that it will cause future damage. 
2 PAS and irrational choice 
In the case of PAS, a child's wish is arguably formed under duress-like 
circumstances. Without recognition of the syndrome, that compulsion will go 
unrecognised. If a child refuses contact with a parent without justification, it 
will arguably meet Freeman's standard as a choice of potentially unforeseen 
future consequences. If the parents themselves actively promote, or cannot see 
the danger in just such a mistake, the court must step in. 
The realm of PAS requires that courts take care in ensuring that the 
child's expressed views are not so influenced or coached by a parent as to be 
other than child's true views. In H v fl 7 it was held that an eight year old child 
was influenced by his mother's attitude to take whatever steps she could to 
avoid contact. In the view of the court this had made it "impossible for the 
child to express any view other than his apparent stated preference not to have 
contact with his father." And further: "To express a wish to see his father 
[would] only lead him into conflict with his mother who is his primary 
caregiver. This would not be an avenue that is open to the child."88 In this 
85 Henaghan and Atkin, above, 295 . 
86 [1993] Manitoba LJ 307, 324. 
87 (August 7, 1992) Family Court, Nelson FP042/107/91 
88 (August 7, 1992) Family Court, Nelson, 5 FP042/ 107/91. 
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context the PAS is described more as a coping mechanism, but it is one that the 
court was alert to. 
Section 23 provides enough room for PAS to be considered and to be 
dealt with appropriately. The Court may recognise the gravity of a child's 
desires, but still be justified in disregarding such wishes in the promotion of his 
or her best interests. 
D Additional factors 
Wishes of the child alone do not constitute the range of considerations 
relevant to that child's best interests. 
In D v W9 Fisher J set out a list of factors additional to wishes of a child that 
might be taken into consideration when best interests were at issue. These 
include:90 
1) welfare of the child as the paramount consideration 
2) an entitlement to love and security including consistent and dependent 
attitudes and behaviour, familiar surroundings, and a known routine 
3) opportunity for personal growth including appropriate role model s 
4) wider family and connections ( including new partners, extended famil y) 
5) wishes of the child 
Arguably in a PAS situation all of the above criteria will be relevant: 
(1) If the child's welfare is best promoted by having access to both parents PAS 
is a barrier. 
(2) If in a PAS situation a child learns that love is contingent upon denigration 
of the target parent, there is no sense of true entitlement to love - in fact, this is 
replaced by a loyalty bind. In terms of attitude and behaviour, alienating parents 
appear to be unable to appropriately regulate these, and the child learns by 
example. The second portion of this limb - for familiarity and routine is only 
89 
[ 1995) 13 FRNZ 336. 
90 
[ 1995) 13 FRNZ 336. 
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advisable if that familiarity and routine are healthy - that is if they coincide 
with the rest of the criteria. 
(3) If the only constant caretaker in the child's life is disparaging of the absent 
caretaker - likely the most significant other person in the child's life - this is 
not a positive role model. A role model who can not be objective about those in 
the child's life or who directs their opinions about those people is not allowing 
the child to form his own opinions and make sense of his own world. 
(4) Naturally, cutting a child off from one parent likely involves removing or 
weakening ties with that parent ' s family removing sources of additional support 
and heritage. 
(5) Finally, the wishes of a child will be affected by the wishes of those around 
them, if their wishes are overridden by an alienating parent then their wishes are 
not indicative of their own true feelings and therefore have little bearing on best 
interests. 
E Section Summary 
Parental Alienation Syndrome is most likely to influence and be 
influenced by the above provisions in both the Guardianship and CYPF Acts. Its 
treatment in terms of both best interests and child ' s wishes will inevitably shape 
the way the syndrome is formulated and either accepted or refused in custody 
and access cases in New Zealand. 
VII PAS IN NEW ZEALAND - CASE STUDIES 
A primary investigation of PAS as it is actually treated in New Zealand 
is the most important part of any research on the subject. It is easy to forget 
that the literature and study is played out in the unfortunate and real forum of 
the Family Court. Hypothesis is unhelpful when the status and future of real 
children in difficult situations are at stake. What the courts actually do with the 
theories and controversies becomes the reality for these children. To help 
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elucidate the practical status of PAS then, five cases will be examined in 
chronological order, demonstrating similarities and progressions where 
possible. 
A p V p 1995 91 
The child in this case was AL, aged four and a half years. She was living 
with her mother at the time of proceedings. In March 1994 an order was made 
to allow the father (S) supervised access to AL. This was so that allegations 
relating to possible sexual abuse of the girl could be observed by a psychologist 
and a report under s 29A of the Guardianship Act could be prepared. In the six 
months prior to this hearing, and due to the actions of both AL and her mother, 
this supervised access was made impossible. On this basis allegations were 
made against the mother which related to her "deliberately or unintentionally 
influencing the child in a way which has resulted in the expression of fear of 
seeing her father"92 
Parental Alienation - notably not parental alienation syndrome - was 
suggested based on the following: First, that the mother had charged the father 
with indecent assault on the girl - this was eventually withdrawn and costs 
awarded in the father's favour. Second, the psychologist's view that the child's 
fear was unsubstantiated, and did not arise for many months subsequent to the 
occurrence of the alleged abuse. 
Submissions made by the psychologist supporting the claim of alienation 
included: 
1) Telephone conversations taped a month after access ceased showed 
that AL was "happy and unreserved in her conversation and indicating 
that she want[ ed] to spend time with [her father]" 
93 
9 1 p vP (16 March 1995) DC North Shore FP 621 /94 Green J. 
92 P v P, above, 2. 
93 P v P, above, 2. 
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2) That the child had a fear of her father akin to what would be expected 
in the event of a major trauma and therefore "out of all proportion to any 
events which might have occurred" 
3) That the fear was "extreme, irrational, and disabling for her."94 
The psychologist in her evidence agreed with the father's counsel that 
"someone must be saying things to AL to have this level of fear a year later" 
and that this was "possibly her mother".95 
One telling occasion which was brought up at trial involved a planned 
meeting with the AL, the mother, the father, and the psychologist. AL had 
agreed to go, but after a matter of moments out of the psychologist's 
observance, she became very distressed. When the psychologist went to 
comfort her she found the mother's de facto partner's child repeating the words: 
"S won't get you, S won't get you." After this, the following interchange was 
recorded by the psychologist:96 
I sat down with AL and asked her what she was scared of. She said:" I' m scared 
of S." I asked her what she thought S would do, she said" Swill touch me." 
I said, "Who told you Swill touch you?" She said," Mummy." 
[The mother] immediately said:" But what has S done?" 
Implying that she was justified in telling AL that S would touch her. 
In light of all of the evidence, Judge Green accepted the psychologist's 
assessment of Parental Alienation and agreed with her that the only way to 
remedy the situation was to allow for access to occur so that the child could 
experience the fact that her fears would not be realised. Careful not to mention 
the syndrome, the Judge also notes the fact of 'internalisation' by the child, of 
the mother's views. The Judge was concerned that "one of the major, long term 
effects of parental alienation is said to be the lack of proper perception of 
94 p v p ( 16 March 1995) DC North Shore FP 621 /94, 3 Green J. 
95 P v P, above, 7. 
96 P v P, above, 3. 
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reality."97 This suggests that the court was indeed looking at this case as one of 
PAS. Situations and groups of factors are not generally Jinked to a 'major long 
term effect' in the way that syndromes are. Supporting the likelihood that the 
court believed it was dealing with PAS, the actions of the parties as reported in 
this case seem somewhat more severe than ordinary alienation in the course of a 
difficult divorce. There seems to be a reluctance in terms of stating the 's' word, 
yet even in terms of Gardner's formulation the case seems clear: the child has a 
severe aversion to one parent, out of step even with the alleged abuse. The child 
appears to interact well with the target parent in the times when they have been 
permitted to be alone. The Mother too fits the description of alienator - she 
typically, almost to the point of a text-book case, takes exception to the 
psychologist's findings, and in terms of access states that she is "not prepared 
to force" the girl to see her father. Not only will she permit unsupervised access 
but she will not even support a meeting with herself present in order that the 
psychologist can get a clearer picture of the true interaction of the allegedly 
abusive parent. Counsel for the child did not express confidence in the mother's 
ability to prepare the child for access in a neutral non-pejorative terms such as 
"you will be fine with dad, you will have fun." As a result, an order was made 
for strictly monitored access so that the father could be observed interacting 
with his daughter, and then weekly monitored access unless the psychologist 
determined otherwise. The mother was threatened with the issue of a warrant to 
enforce this access if such action became necessary. No comment was made as 
to the severity of the alienation, nor as to more drastic possibilities such as a 
switch in custody. 
97 p v p ( 16 March 1995) DC North Shore FP 62 1 /94, 4 Green J. 
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B Thomas v Thomas 1996 98 
In this case the issue was whether the two girls in question should be 
declared as children 'in need of care and protection' under section 14(a)(b)and 
(h) of the Children Young Persons and their Families Act 1989. 
Subsection (a) maintains that a child is in need if they are being or are 
likely to be harmed (whether physically emotionally or sexually), ill-treated, 
abused or seriously deprived. 
Subsection (b) concerns whether the child or young person's 
development or physical, or mental, or emotional well-being is being or is 
likely to be impaired or neglected, and that impairment or neglect is, or is likely 
to be, serious and avoidable. 
Finally, section(h) inquires whether serious differences exist between a 
parent, guardian or other person having the care of the child or young person 
and any other parent, guardian or other person having the care of the child or 
young person to such an extent that the physical, or mental, or emotional well-
being of the child or young person is being seriously impaired. 
Prior to this hearing, in 1992 Mr. Thomas was granted custody of his 
two daughters, born in 1985 ( 11 years old at the time of this hearing) and 1987 
(nine years old). In 1993 custody was confirmed, but Mr. Thomas was 
cautioned that he must make an effort to: "improve his relationship as it 
involves the children with Mrs. Thomas to foster access and tum the children's 
view of their mother around. Failure to do this could result in a reassessment of 
custody." 99 
98 Thomas v Thomas (28 March 1996) DC Christchurch FP 009/92/90 Bisphan J. 
99 Thomas v Thomas , above, 3. 
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It appears that the judge at that earlier date accepted the diagnosis of 
PAS. If this was the case though, perhaps it was not wise to use PAS as threat 
of reassessment of custody. If the judge did accept PAS it would likely have 
been better at that time to do something concrete. If PAS is caused by an 
alienating parent, simply requesting them to stop makes little sense. Again the 
question is 'if' this truly is an example of the syndrome, it is unlikely for the 
alienator to change tack- and as the case demonstrates Mr Thomas was unable 
to do so. This points to the need to formulate what should happen if a diagnosis 
of PAS is accepted. Certainly an order as to counselling for some if not all of 
the parties should have been made at that earlier time. 
In the intervening time between the current hearing and the one in 1993 
the children showed resistance to access to their mother. On various occasions 
they ran away from school, and on one occasion ran away from their mother's 
home in the night and went to a police station. There were also denials of 
access by Mr Thomas. Both the father and his children explained their 
resistance to time with Mrs Thomas with reference to the following factors: she 
smoked, she swore at the children, and that she would physically beat them. In 
response to these allegations the mother replied that she "tries not to smoke in 
the presence of the children, that her swearing is ... of little consequence and that 
she does not now beat them physically."100
 It is necessary here to remind the 
reader that PAS stresses that the alienation or avoidance be unwarranted. But it 
is not difficult to imagine why the children in this case might seek to avoid this 
parent. While there is evidence of alienation on Mr Thomas' part, it seems that 
his concerns about his ex-wife are substantiated. The danger of accepting PAS 
without giving full consideration to other possibilities risks punishing a 
concerned parent for his valid views. 
100 Thomas v Thomas , above, 4. 
42 
In an assessment of Mr Thomas, and the resulting proposal of PAS the 
Judge summarises the court report writer's report 
observations: 
including following 
I) Mr Thomas has created a narcissistic family ... wherein the two 
children have no option but to fall in with Mr Thomas' agenda 
2) Mr Thomas is fearful of losing the children because of matters in his 
background. 
3) Mr Thomas has extreme dependency on the children and keeping 
them in his custody. 
4) He carries deep feelings of hurt and resentment against Mrs Thomas. 
5) That his complaints against Mrs Thomas although real, are 
insubstantial and are covering up the real issues. He has no insight 
into the fact that he is causative of many of the problems in this 
access dispute. 
6) He has no insight as to how his behaviour impacts on the children. 
7) The family dynamic has caused a 'splitting' whereby the children 
perceive their father as all good and their mother as all bad. 
In many ways this report is very good, touching on all of the issues that one 
might expect in a PAS discussion. However there seems to be a 
disproportionate emphasis on the alleged alienator and less on the children. 
The terms used to describe Mr Thomas including narcissistic, lack of insight, " 
fear" due to matters in his background, as well as 'splitting' to describe the 
children's reactions, all point to an analysis infom1ed by the work of Dr 
Kopetski of the Family and Children's Evaluation Team in Chicago. His 
extension on Gardner's approach was to identify particular familial and 
personality characteristics of alienating parents which in summary include
101
: 
I) Narcissistic and paranoid relationships 
2) Externalisation of painful feelings and responsibi lity, turning mner 
conflict into interpersonal conflict 
3) Anger instead of sadness in reaction to the loss ofa marital partner 
101 Paraphrased from LM Kopetski "Identifying Cases of Parent Alienation Syndrome: Part I and Part 
II" [ 1998] Colorado Lawyer 61, 65. 
4) A family history in which splitting (or externalising) is a prominent 
feature, perhaps being raised in a family where there is unresolved or 
unacknowledged grief. 
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There should be some concern when a judgment begins to read like a model 
case. This suggests perhaps that the situation is being 'fitted' to what the 
experts regard as the right criteria. Since the requirements for PAS have not 
been formalised this sets a dangerous precedent and may elevate one of many 
studies on the subject to the status of definitive study on the subject. 
Under the above sections in the CYPF Act the enquiry is one into a 
condition or state of affairs. Under declaration proceedings the enquiry is not 
one of why a condition exists or who is responsible. The use of PAS therefore 
is to demonstrate that Mr Thomas is an unfit parent and does not add much to 
the inquiry of how PAS is affecting the children. 
Counsel for Mr Thomas challenged the Doctor's report and submitted 
that PAS had been discredited. The Judge stated that he "was not aware of this 
from any other source and there was certainly no expert evidence to that 
effect." 102 The judge implies that he believes PAS does exist and that it is a 
creditable theory. However, following this, Judge Bisphan states that there is 
"[ d]anger in placing too much emphasis on theories" and "[i]n attaching too 
much significance to labels. Because a certain pattern of behaviour is labelled 
by psychologists that does not convert the conduct into a form of definable 
and/or treatable illness." He continues to assert that he prefers "to look at the 
reality of what is happening in the family and regard the theories or stated 
syndromes as simply tags by which the conduct can be conveniently 
identified." 103 In light of the background of this paper, and the interests of doing 
justice in the particular case this seems like a sensible pronouncement. But if 
p AS is going to gain acceptance or be relegated to the annals of pseudo-science 
102 Thomas v Thomas (28 March 1996) DC Christchurch FP 009/92/90, 5 Bisphan J. 
103 Thomas v Thomas , above, 5. 
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one wonders if a decision should be made one way or the other. This judgment 
states that PAS is recognised but that not much weight will be attached to 
theories. Confusingly however the theory of PAS is what confirms its existence 
in this case, and PAS in tum is what confirms that "the children are suffering 
abuse in the current circumstances of their family life." 
104 
Having seen no change in the parties since the 1993 hearing Judge 
Bisphan decided that a declaration was necessary. Caught between an 
irresponsible mother and a father with emotional problems, the children were 
held to be in need of care and protection. There was no real discussion of Mr 
Thomas' emotional condition other than PAS, which was then sidelined as a 
'tag' for conduct. With something as serious as the removal of his children one 
might have thought a 'tag' would be insufficient. 
The focus of an inquiry under section 14 (h) is on the caregivers and it is 
therefore right that there should be more inquiry into the parent ' s states than 
there would be under section 23 of the Guardianship Act. However, from the 
judgment and what it details of the report made by the Doctor there is very little 
delving into the state of the children. It is noted that they "see their mother in a 
bad light and all blame is shifted to her for the problems concerning access,"
105 
and that stress has resulted in their suffering psychosomatic and somatic 
illnesses. But the fact that their aversion is justified should call into question the 
diagnosis of PAS. It may be that Mr Thomas is a poor father with little insight 
into the well-being of his children, it may also be that he has difficulty dealing 
with the loss of his marriage, however these things do not make PAS. It is well 
that the case did not tum on this diagnosis - but it is stressed heavily in the 
judgment and one wonders if it was treated as more than a tag in a case where it 
did not accurately describe the situation. 
104 Thomas v Thomas, above, 7. 
105 Thomas v Thomas (28 March 1996) DC Christchurch FP 009/92/90, 5 Bisphan J. 
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C LvS1997 106 
In L v S the disputed custody involved a child: J, who was 12 at the time 
the case went to trial. The wishes of the child involved remaining in the sole 
care of her father with no access to her mother. PAS was alleged against the 
father and was held to have been "clearly established". This finding went 
toward the decision of how best to accommodate the child's wishes in light of 
her father's influence. 
The facts of the separation and custody included an emigration of the 
family to New Zealand from Taiwan in 1994 - after which the mother returned 
to Taiwan for a period of six months. Upon her return, the marriage broke down 
and the children remained in the custody of their father. There was domestic 
violence alleged on both sides and the father was indeed convicted of male 
assaults female in New Zealand. The fact that the mother had left her children 
in the care of their father for six months however, was seen as confirmation that 
the mother had no true concerns as to their safety with him. 
A detailed discussion of PAS was undertaken in this case. The expert 
evidence confirming the diagnosis of PAS hinged on the factors that: J had 
expressed antipathy towards the mother and had denigrated her, and that J's 
sentiments were more than the usual deep feelings that would flow from the 
strain of custody and access. These were taken into consideration having 
regard to the Dunne and Hedrick criteria mentioned in section II of this paper. 
Although PAS was accepted as a factor influencing the child's expressed 
wishes, Judge Bisphan remained unconvinced of the gravity of such a finding. 
Sceptical of the syndrome he noted that there was "some danger in ... creating a 
catch phrase for a state of affairs and then elevating it into a recognised 
psychological or psychiatric condition."
107 
106 15 FRNZ 408. 
107 L v S 15 FRNZ 408, 412. 
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The absence of the mother, her own violence, and cultural factors 
relating to the norm of filiopiety in Taiwan were also raised as possible causes 
of the demonstrated alienation. Still, after examining all of the evidence, Judge 
Bisphan said that he accepted the diagnosis of PAS "regardless of how it 
occurred."
108 This seems at odds with the true analysis of the 'syndrome.' As 
discussed above, the syndrome specifically requires that the alienation and 
denigration of the target parent be caused by actions on the part of the 
alienating parent. Further, any alienation expressed is to be causally unfounded. 
In this case, the fact of a long absence of one parent, particularly after the 
unsettling effects of emigration, would of itself seem an obvious situation for 
alienation to occur. The danger discussed above - that PAS and Parental 
Alienation might be confused - appears to have arisen here. The syndrome, 
while accepted, has perhaps been accepted for the wrong reasons. It appears 
from the tenor of the judgment that the syndrome is not truly understood by the 
finder of fact. Judge Bisphan is dubious of the existence of PAS, yet he accepts 
all the alienation present as demonstration of the syndrome. 
PAS in this case was established for the purposes of determining what 
should happen to J in terms of custody. Based on a report which analysed 16 
separate cases of PAS, the court recognised that ultimately "each case [was] to 
be evaluated on its own merits and the identification of a parental alienation 
syndrome [was] not sufficient in and of itself to justify changes in custody."
109 
Contrary to the expert's opinion in this case, and although it was felt that J was 
affected by parental alienation syndrome, a 'deprogramming' switch of custody 
was held by Judge Bisphan to not be warranted. As an explanation for this 
Judge Bisphan stated that there was "no consensus . .. as to how the problem 
c[ ould] be remedied" and that " the research and studies are not sufficient to 
give the Court confidence that a change in custody in this particular case 
108 L v S 15 FRNZ408, 4l4. 
109 Dunne and Hedrick "The Parental Alienation Syndrome: An Analys is of Sixteen Selected C
ases" 
(1994) 21 J of Divorce and Remarriage 21 , 36. 
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[would be] warranted." 110 Instead, with regard to J's best interests it was felt 
that access to the mother should be resumed. Custody remained with J's father 
in the stabilizing home and surroundings she had known for two years. 
Counselling was suggested. 
It is likely that this decision satisfied J's best interests, however to 
believe that is to place no belief in the syndrome. If PAS does indeed exist, and 
did indeed play a role in this case, it seems inappropriate to first acknowledge it 
and then to leave J in the custody of someone who arguably causes her 
psychological damage. The potential that a diagnosis of PAS has been 
inappropriately made in this case however is concerning. Certainly whether 
the disorder exists or not is a matter for the opinion of the psychological expert, 
but the way it is utilised by the finder of fact has serious implications, 
particularly as to this case's future use as precedent. The scepticism that Judge 
Bisphan shows for the syndrome is prudent, particularly in light of the facts in 
this circumstance. However, his reluctance to fully endorse the syndrome 
appears to be caused more by his scepticism of Gardner's radical- custody-
swap-remedy than in the diagnosis itself. 
110 L v S 15 FRNZ 408, 416. 
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D Baker v Stuhlmann 2001 111 
This case involved an application for access. The children: R 9Y2 years 
old, and N aged 12 lived with their father. The mother was only pursuing access 
to R, having given up on any reconciliation with her daughter. The background 
to this application included the parents separation in 1993 after which the 
mother had custody with access to the father. There were difficulties over 
access, culminating with an allegation in 1999 by R that he had been sexually 
assaulted by the father ' s new wife. These allegations were retracted, then re-
retracted, and custody was changed to the father with access to the mother. This 
access provision was not successful. 
All parties other than the mother accepted that no abuse had occurred. 
The mother however would only go as far as to accept that the abuse would 
never be proven one way or the other. Despite her adamant belief that abuse did 
occur, the father believed that the allegations were part of a malicious campaign 
by the mother and suggested PAS. 
At that previous hearing, The judge found that "probably the mother did 
not deliberately coach R to make the statements and it is more probable that 
they emanated from the parental conflict. . . "
112 Nevertheless, Parental 
Alienation (note: not syndrome) was accepted as a factor, and it seems that 
Gardner ' s text-book shift in custody was implemented at that time. It is not 
clear from the judgment whether R - although he had made the allegations, was 
in any way fearful of or resistant to access to his father. The change in custody 
seems somewhat extreme in the situation as it is reported, and one wonders if 
the rationale of the change had a punitive purpose related to the false 
allegations of abuse. 
During the current application, the reverse of the previous situation was 
alleged. Counsel submitted that there had been both overt and covert parental 
111 Baker v Stuhlmann ( 6 Aug 200 I) FC Auckland FP 1763 - D/0 I, Judge Bisphan. 
112 Baker v Stuh!mann, above, 4 . 
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alienation of R by the father. A statement from the father made his disinterest 
in access clear. He maintained that: 113 
the dominant factor which ha[ d] undermined any possibility of access between the 
applicant and the children is a deep-seated hatred of me and my household ... Until 
I can be satisfied that the children will not be exposed to that. .. I simply cannot 
accept that any access would be in their interests 
The expert evidence stated that R was believed to be "two thirds of the 
way down the alienation continuum" 114 while his sister had reached 100 per 
cent. Alienation in this context was explained by Dr Smith as meaning, not that 
emotional ties with his mother were broken but "that R's view of his mother is 
negatively focussed at this time" 115 This seems then, not really a demonstration 
of the syndrome as such and thus perhaps rightly referred to as bare Parental 
Alienation. Dr Smith stated that: 
116 
There are a number of factors that could be interpreted as supporting a hypothesis 
of parental alienation but to do so would require the rejection of equally plausible 
explanations for the behaviour. For example, and R do indeed display a rapid 
deterioration in their relationship with their mother following the change of 
custody and increased contact with their father. However at the same time they 
were faced with intense parental conflict. .. a resumption in court proceedings and 
unresolved issues in respect of the statements made by R. 
The confusion in terms is clear here. Were the doctor talking about reserving 
comment on the existence of PAS the above statement would be appropriate, 
but bare alienation can come from any cause including intense parental conflict 
as listed above. The Doctor's reservations about the syndrome are justified but 
it is not helpful that she uses the terms PAS and Parental Alienation 
interchangeably concluding: "that it is simply not possible to make direct causal 
11 3 Baker v Stul,/mann , above, 7. 
114 Baker v Stuhlmann (6 Aug 200 I) FC Auckland FP 1763 - D/01,5 Judge Bisphan. 
115 Baker v Stuhlmann , above, 5. 
116 Baker v Stuhlmann, above, 5. 
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links to PAS ... as there are sets of alternative plausible explanations for the 
behaviour and attitudes." 117 
Judge Bisphan echoed the therapist's report and was satisfied that "it 
[was] more important to assess the fact of parental alienation rather than the 
causes of it although the causes cannot be ignored." 118 This perhaps reflects the 
inquiry under section 23, notably different to that under section 14 of the CYPF 
Act. While he does not make any statement on the presence or absence of PAS, 
Judge Bisphan does find that R has been 'alienated' and that the significance of 
that finding is to treat alienation as a factor which must "impinge on the weight 
to be attached to R's wishes not to see his mother. It is a factor which may be 
overriding his true feelings" 119 This appears a sensible course, though not one 
entirely related to the presence or absence of PAS. 
The boy's wishes were to neither live with his mother nor to have access 
to her. However these were recognised to be of recent origin and had apparently 
strengthened with his confusion over why his mother has abandoned a claim to 
his sister but persisted in her claim to himself. Dr Smith reported that: 
120 
R is adamant at least at surface level about his wish to live with his father and 
not see his mother. However other statements and actions made by R present a 
less clear picture. For example he indicated that 'when this is over and I am still 
living with Dad I might ask [ to see his mother]' 
This hearkens back to one of the criteria used for the diagnosis of PAS: that 
while the child might scorn one parent, he retains an unspoken closeness and 
affection for that parent. 
117 Baker v Stuh/mann (6 Aug 200 I) FC Auckland FP 1763 -D/01,5-6 Judge Bisphan. 
118 Baker v Stuh/111a1111, above, 5. 
119 Baker v Stuhl111a1111 , above, 6. 
120 Baker v Stuli/111a1111 (6 Aug 200 I) FC Auckland FP 1763-D/01,7-8 Judge Bisphan. 
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The Doctor notes that rather than reflecting his own expenence, R's 
reasoning originates with his father or . Her advice was not to disregard what 
"R is trying to say to the court, but rather that consideration needs to be given 
as to which parts of the information are accurate" Her opinion was that R's 
expressed wishes might simply reflect a desire to end his 'loyalty bind'. This 
advice was embraced by Judge Bisphan and reflected in his decision to hear R's 
views with caution: "R's views must be taken into account. It would be 
impossible to ignore them. His views at present coincide with what is in fact 
happening - that he is not seeing his mother." 121 
The Judge felt R's maturity was at a level of a normal nine and a half 
year old. There was at this point no mention of the potentially contributing 
factor that 9-10 year olds in divorce tend to openly express anger and to 
commonly align with one parent. 122 However, age and maturity were certainly 
not ignored in the proceedings. Judge Bisphan made it clear that he recognised 
R as being "at an age where he needs direction. The influences on his 
wishes ... including a component of parental alienation, lead me to the view that 
R's expressed wishes are not necessarily his true wishes, and that his wishes are 
not necessarily consonant with his best interests"
123 and later: "I find, bearing in 
mind his age and maturity, that R's wishes are to be taken into account but are 
not decisive. They have been influenced by many factors and are not 
representative of his true wishes. They do not accord with his best interests." 
124 
The consequences of following R's wishes and allowing this situation to 
continue were canvassed by Dr. Smith and reiterated by Judge Bisphan: "if R is 
denied a relationship with his mother, she may become an object of myth and 
fantasy. He may begin to see his father as all good and his mother as all bad."
125 
The Judge, while considering the other influences in his life felt that R's 
121 Baker v Stuhl111an11, above, 9. 
122 J Wallerstein, J Kelly, "The Effects of Parental Divorce"( 1975) 14 American Academy Child 
Psychiatry 600, 616. 
123 Baker v Stuhlmann (6 Aug 200 I) FC Auckland FP 1763 - 0 /01,9-10 Judge Bisphan. 
124 Baker v Stuhlmann, above, 13 . 
125 Baker v Stuhlma1111 , above, 11. 
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negative view was "not objectively justified." 126 He held that there was "some 
element of parental alienation emanating from the father and his household" 127 
and that the risks of reinstituting access to the mother outweighed the risks in 
refusing all access. Still looking at R's wishes, the judge recognised the 
possibility that "R w[ ould] be disappointed and even upset by my decision but, 
... he is still of an age and maturity where he must learn that some crucially 
important decisions still have to be made for him" and that: "R' s wishes are 
only one aspect (albeit important) of the assessment of what is in his best 
interests." 128 
It is evident that Judge Bisphan made a concerted effort to take the 
child's interests into account and although he did not follow them, they were 
not simply dismissed on the fact of immaturity. The concern that his choices 
could have caused any relationship with his mother to terminate seems to be 
severe enough to have warranted his wishes ' irrational ' and therefore allowed 
the court to override those wishes. 
On the suggestion of Dr. Smith, a measured approach to access was 
taken. Custody was to remain with father with access to the mother of 
increasing frequency and duration. Further counselling for all of the parties was 
ordered. Any contact initiated by R was to be encouraged. The court felt -
contrary to views of Gardner - that a subtle change in access would be less 
harmful than a drastic one. Since it was only Parental Alienation, and not PAS 
found in this case, the orders appear valid. 
126 Baker v Stuh/mann (6 Aug 2001) FC Auckland FP 1763 - D/01 ,14 Judge Bisphan . 
127 Baker v Stuhlmann , above, 13. 
128 Baker v Stuhlmann , above, 15 . 
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E Kenrick v Sheridan 2001 129 
This case concerned a cross application for custody of three children of 
a de facto relationship. The children were: S aged 7, M aged 4 and K aged 2. 
The last separation of the parties was in March of 2001. The children had been 
in the care of their father in the family home for five months up to the time of 
this hearing. The eldest child was the focus of much of the hearing. Post-
separation, S became resistant to access in the extreme. He accused his mother 
of physical abuse. When he had to go access, he would physically lash out at 
his mother, scream for help from neighbours and police, and call his mother 
names. 130 He would also accuse her, saying: "Dad says you've left me and Dad 
said you stole me, stop stealing me." 131 
The name calling and the content of the outbursts coincide with a study 
of children with so-called brainwashing parents. 132 Detection of brainwashing 
parents included the appearance of statements such as those made by S, 
including: inappropriate and unnecessary information, demonstrated in 85% of 
cases; unchildlike statements (30%); character assault (60%); and scripted 
views such as the view that the mother was ' stealing him' in 45% of cases. The 
above observations also coincide with a study by Waldron, 133 who stated that 
PAS usually follows three stages: First, the theme of the alienation is chosen, 
for instance abandonment or the threat of kidnapping (emphasis on stealing). 
This is followed by 'mood induction ' which involves techniques such as guilt, 
playing the victim, and sympathy seeking - all which are implicit in the above 
statement. Finally the reward/ punishment stage where the child ' s contributions 
129 Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 2001 ) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
130 " lazy bitch, stupid idiot, dumb mum, fucking bitch . .. " Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 200 I) FC 
Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 2 Judge Anni s E Sommerville. 
131 Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 200 I) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 2 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
132 Stanley S Clawar and others Children Held Hostage. Dealing with Programmed and Brainwashed 
Children. (American Bar Association, Chicago, 1991) 174. 
133 Waldron Kenneth H David E Joanis " Understanding and Collaboratively Treating Parental 
AlienationSyndrome"(l996) IOAmericanJFL 121 , 127-128 
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are rewarded or punished to the extent that they coincide with the alienating 
parents' desires. 
Relevant to the upheaval at access is to recognise that these would have 
been some of the very few times when both parents were in contact with their 
children. In the extended list of PAS symptoms observed by Dunne and 
Hedrick, it is noted that "Hatred of the parent is most intense when the 
alienating parent and the child are in the presence of the alienated parent." 134 It 
was apparent that the father's influence at these times was not muted. In 
various botched access changeovers, often where the father had anticipated a 
reconciliation with his ex-partner, the man had flown into a rage, sobbed and 
ranted, called his ex-partner names, called the police when she brought family 
members along, and generally acted-out his distress in front of the children. 
The father believed that the mother was abusive. On one occasion S 
returned from access with a red eye and a bandage on his arm. S stated that his 
mother had given him a 'blood eye,' that she had hit him with an open hand, 
and that she had broken his arm. A doctor who examined S in his father's 
presence found that the boy had mild conjunctivitis, no obvious bruising or 
swelling, and his arm was not broken. Despite this report the father would not 
be swayed from the idea that the mother had abused the child. The Judge found 
that "although the evidence from S is inconsistent and changes with different 
stories to different people Mr. Kenrick is not deterred."
135 When giving oral 
evidence, the father stated on three separate occasions that he knews "100 per 
cent that S was abused by his mother and that physically forcing the child to go 
on access [ was J abusive." 136 Despite this, the father related to his psychologist 
that he was "supportive of the children's relationship with their mother but that 
134 Dunne, Hedrick "The Parental Alienation Syndrome: An analysis of sixteen selected cases" ( 1994) 
21 J of Divorce and Remarriage 24, 33. 
135 Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 200 I) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 4 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
136 Kenrick v Sheridan, above, 4. 
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the mother is not supportive of the children and their needs." 137 The mother's 
explanation for the bandage on the arm was that S had complained it was sore 
after a tire fell on him at his father's home. The mother gave him a bandage as 
a panacea. 
Judge Somerville regarded the access issue as extremely senous. In 
relation to the best interests test he said: "There is no way a child should be put 
in a situation where he is fearful of a parent or ... where his safety is jeopardised 
in any way"138 However with the aid of a section 29A report, it was found that 
when S was with his mother alone there was no indication that he was fearful of 
her. Occasionally he would threaten 139 to go back to his Dad if he did not get 
his way, but otherwise he was "well behaved, and when he dropped his guard, 
was seen to enjoy engaging with her." 140 The theme of retaining an unspoken 
affection for the target parent is accepted as one of the symptoms to look for 
when making a diagnosis of PAS as noted above. 
There had been past allegations of spousal violence on both sides of the 
parental divide. A temporary protection order against the father involving an 
allegation that he had threatened to "take [his wife's] life" if the children were 
taken from him, was instated and then discharged. On several occasions the 
father had been reported by third parties as being verbally abusive to the mother 
in the presence of the children. The judge held however that the children would 
be physically safe in either of their parents' care. 
Judge Somerville recognised that "there [ would be] no opportunity for 
personal growth of the children if they [were] held back by parent's behaviour 
and attitudes. By the father supporting S's continuing behaviour he [was] 
137 Kenrick v Sheridan , above, 4. 
138 Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 2001) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 5 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
139 Another indicator of a brainwashing parent found in 8% of cases studied by Stanely Clawar and 
others Children Held Hostage. Dealing with Programmed and Brainwashed Children. (American Bar 
Association, Chicago, 1991) 174. 
14° Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 2001) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 5 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
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causing the child to become alienated from the mother." 141 Dr. Parsonson 
considered that this was already occurring stating that: "S' s behaviour 
suggest[ed] that some of his behaviour may be modelled from hi s father"
142 
It was apparent at access changeovers that S wished not to leave with his 
mother. However this aversion did not seem to carry over into the rest of his 
behaviour. Indeed, in his interview with Judge Somerville, it was noted that S 
did not mention ill-treatment from his mother. His only complaint was that he 
did not want to stay at her new house. He would not say anything positive 
about either parent and the judge noted that he preferred to not talk about his 
situation if he could possibly avoid it. 
The judge inquired as to whether there has been Parental Alienation. He 
omitted to say syndrome, but uses the Byrne list of symptoms as a guide. 
Without actually stating his belief in the syndrome, Judge Somerville 
determined that the criterion of verbal denigration yet unspoken closeness 
(which S clearly demonstrated) was "the most important aspect of 
alienation." 143 Although 'syndrome' remains unmentioned, the way that the 
Doctor describes alienation throughout the case made it clear that he too was 
discussing the syndrome, stating that the ultimate effect of parental alienation 
will be that "the child simply has no contact with the other parent, completely 
isolates, denies the existence of [them] and will not have any contact."
144 
The Judge noted that he looked to L v S145 for guidance in the area of 
parental alienation. This is an improvement on the method of blindly following 
only the recommendations of the assembled experts. However, if the court is 
going to make steps to use precedent on the issue, they must be careful of how 
narrowly or widely they construe the syndrome. Looking to L vS suggests that 
141 Kenrick v Sheridan , above, 11. 
142 Kenrick v Sheridan, above, 11 . 
143 Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 2001 ) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 13 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
144 Kenrick v Sheridan , above, 13. 
145 15 FRNZ 408. 
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there is a body of precedent forming in New Zealand, and that courts are now 
going to begin to take seriously the way they define PAS. 
There is confusion in the judgment as the judge recommends a change in 
custody because it is "early days and intervention at this point of time is 
essential [to remedy the alienation]" 146 but one paragraph later he states that "S 
is on the verge of being alienated from his mother unless the situation 
changes." 147 The 'verge' is an unfortunate choice of words implying that the 
syndrome is not yet affecting the child - even though his outbursts at access and 
his father's beliefs are in the extreme. One would imagine Judge Somerville 
was implying that S was on the verge of being' 100% alienated' along the lines 
of the 'alienation continuum' proposed in Baker v Stuhlmann. 
It was held that the mother should have custody of all three children. 
Access was explicitly spelt out for the following year including the amount and 
dates of access and telephone communication. Some discretion and flexibility 
remained for the parents on holidays, but the Judge emphasised that if there 
were "difficulties with S on access then the holidays are to be strictly adhered 
to as per the order." 148 The father was to attend an anger management 
programme. Both parents were ordered to attend a positive parenting course 
with a view to learning how to control S. S himself was ordered to attend 
counselling "to learn appropriate coping strategies".
149 
F Summary of the Case Law 
It is unwise to make any bold statements about the treatment of PAS in 
New Zealand based only on the examination of a small number of cases. 
However it is potentially valuable to flag the similarities and trends that have 
been demonstrated even in this small sample. To this end, three comparisons 
146 Ke11rick v Sheridan (7 September 2001) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 14 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
147 Ke11rick v Sherida11 , above, 14. 
148 Kenrick v Sheridan , above, 21 . 
149 Kenrick v Sheridan (7 September 2001) FC Rotorua FP 063/7/99, 21 Judge Annis E Sommerville. 
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will be undertaken. First, an observation of the peculiarities of the cases as a 
group. Second, the concurrence of syndrome criteria and exhibited behaviours. 
Finally, the trends in judicial treatment of PAS throughout the cases. 
1 Observations on the cases as a group 
Interestingly four of the five cases involved children in the primary 
custody of their fathers against whom PAS was alleged. This is contrary to the 
majority of cases150 in New Zealand, where children of the relationship continue 
to live in the primary custody of their mother after separation.
151 
This sample 
size is too small to come to any conclusion on that fact, however it is merely 
noted that this seems not to coincide with Gardner's original opinion that the 
mother is the alienating parent in 90 per cent of cases, or even with his recent 
contention that the split between alienating parents is equal. 
Other than the four and a half year old in P v P, the children involved in 
the above cases were between the ages of seven and 12 with separation 
occurring roughly between the ages of seven and nine. 
152 
The developmental 
stage of children in this age group was not addressed in any of the cases other 
than as regards maturity, but as discussed earlier, 
153 
alignment is common in 
this group without the need for any action on the part of the parents. This should 
be taken into account along with the other factors
154 
that make a conclusive 
determination of PAS uncertain. 
150 70-80% of the time 
15 1 A Lee A Survey of Parents Who Obtained a Dissolution , (Dept of Justice 1990) 
152 Except for R in Baker v Stuhlmann who was only two at the time of separation, but was seven 
when he made the first allegation of abuse. 
153 At page 15. 
154 Such as the litigation, the fact of divorce, previous abuse, absence of parent. 
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2 Syndrome criteria 
The cases of Kenrick v Sheridan and L v S looked to the checklists 
compiled by Byrne, and Dunne and Hedrick 155 when discussing those 
symptoms that would support a finding of PAS. As stated above, this is an 
expansion on the Byrne criteria outlined in at least two current reference 
publications. An examination of the cases shows symptoms of PAS as they are 
recorded in one or both of the lists. Exhibited more frequently were the 
following: 
(a) The child's aversion appears to be justified but 1s flimsy and 
exaggerated. 
This was suggested in Thomas v Thomas in terms of the children ' s 
aversion to their mother, which the court found to be out of step with their 
experiences. It was also evident in P v P where the young child exhibited a 
fear of her father which was found to be "extreme and irrational."
156 
In 
Kenrick v Sheridan the child had an extreme reaction to access, and had made 
allegations of abuse, both which appeared to be baseless. 
(b) The child will verbally denigrate one parent but retains an unspoken 
closeness and affection for that parent. 
157 
In P v P, AL appeared to be in great fear of her father, yet conversations 
and interactions alone were observed to be normal and loving. R in Baker v 
Stuhlmann was adamant about not having contact with his mother, yet he 
revealed that once the litigation process was over he did have an interest in 
seeing her. In Kenrick v Sheridan it was found that the extreme behaviour at 
155 At page 4 . 
156 p v p (16 March 1995) DC North Shore FP 62 1/94, 3 Green J. 
157 Or alternatively: Hatred of the parent is most incense when the alienating parent and the child are 
in the presence of the alienated parent. However, when the child is alone with the alienated parent, the 
child may exhibit hatred, neutrality, or expressions of affection. 
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access changeovers all but disappeared when the mother and her son were 
alone. This contrast led Judge Somerville to conclude that this factor was "the 
most important aspect of alienation." 
( c) The alienating parent, while seemingly acting in the best interests of the 
children, is actually working to destroy the relationship between them 
and the other parent. 158 
Comments made to this effect included the mother's assertion in P v P 
that she was hamstrung by the clear wishes of her child and would not "force" 
AL to see her father. In Thomas v Thomas , the complaints of the mother's 
unfitness were echoed by both the children and the father, who summarised 
with the statement that the mother was not "supportive of their needs". In Baker 
v Stuhlmann the father could not accept that contact would be in his children's 
best interests. Finally, in Kenrick v Sheridan the father stated numerous times 
that he thought the mother was violent, and even when faced with evidence to 
the contrary he maintained that forcing the child to go on access was abusive. 
3 Trends of judicial treatment 
The above cases demonstrate that while PAS is not absolutely accepted 
as operative factor in custody litigation, neither is its basis or validity rigorously 
tested. It is clear that the experts and finders of fact are open to argument based 
on the syndrome. What is not clear however, is what it means when the courts 
determine that PAS is a factor or is proven. In some cases PAS had been held to 
be "clearly established," 159 but the ensuing orders did little to address it. In 
other cases a child has been held to be only "on the verge" of bare Parental 
Alienation, yet this has justified a change in custody. Looking at the decisions 
as a whole seems to suggest that PAS continues to be treated not only on a case 
158 Or alternatively: Th e alienating parent will concur with the children and support their belief that 
these reasons justify the alienation . 
159L vS 15 FRNZ 408,414. 
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by case basis but in an ad hoe manner. What is clear is that the courts are 
reluctant to both make the bold statement that PAS exists and then to state an 
appropriate response. 
Arguably all of the cases have had a just result. In most cases access 
arrangements have been enforced or reinstated, and in all cases it has been 
ordered that the child in question is to have contact with both parents. Even in 
the case of Thomas v Thomas 160 where, although neither parent had custody of 
the children, a decision on care and protection was made essentially because a 
relationship with both parents could not be otherwise promoted. Despite the 
above outcomes however, correct results do not mean correct reasoning. The 
fact that PAS or bare Parental Alienation was established, or not established did 
not seem to correlate with the decisions made. This does not demonstrate a true 
acceptance of PAS. Without judicial acknowledgement a correct response to 
PAS will not be formulated. 
In all of the cases the terminology and analysis of the syndrome makes it 
clear that the voice of the expert has heavily informed the judgement. In only 
one of the cases (L v S) did the Judge differ from the expert ' s opinion on the 
orders to be made. The heavy dependence on the expert opinion however, has 
lead to inconsistencies in the judgements, particularly where the experts 
themselves confused the terms 'PAS ' and 'Parental Alienation ' . Such 
conflicting pronouncements made it difficult to determine exactly what the 
decision in some of the cases meant. In addition, confusion of terms allowed the 
finders of fact to accept PAS, and then to back-track on their faith of its 
existence. For example, in Thomas v Thomas 161 it was stated that the existence 
of PAS was "clear" and then later that the syndrome was no more than a "tag 
160 Thomas v Thomas (28 March 1996) DC Chri stchurch FP 009/92/90, Bisphan J. 
161 Thomas v Thomas (2 8 March 1996) DC Chri stchurch FP 009/92/90, 5 Bisphan J. 
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for conduct". In L v S162 as well, PAS was held to be "clearly established" but 
shortly it was relegated to the status of"catch phrase for a state of affairs." 
The earlier judgements in particular seemed to demonstrate less concern 
with the weight that a finding of PAS might carry. In these cases, even where 
PAS had been found, major changes in the access arrangements were not 
undertaken. In addition, the earlier cases make recommendations of counselling, 
but not with the seriousness that one would expect from an effective 
determination of emotional abuse. The most recent cases took a more proactive 
approach to orders on counselling and access arrangements. Perhaps this 
demonstrates an increasing recognition of the level of conflict inherent in 
alienation cases, and the nature of the problem, which would make changes 
devised by the parties alone futile. Also improved was the correlation between 
the finding and the orders made: In Baker v Stuhlmann PAS was found to not 
have been conclusively proven, therefore efforts were made to remedy the 
alienation with very little disruption of the current access situation. In Kenrick v 
Sheridan PAS was found and a corresponding switch in custody was made. The 
two most recent cases also take a more careful view of the syndrome. In Baker v 
Stuhlmann there was an investigation of other factors which might have caused 
alienation, and in Kenrick v Sheridan there was a nod both to precedent and to 
theoretical syndrome criteria to aid in the judgement. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Without a strong understanding of the Parental Alienation Syndrome, 
there is little hope for an appropriate finding. Until the syndrome is more 
clearly defined, it will be difficult to regard it as an appropriate basis on which 
to found allegations of emotional abuse or a change in custody. Certainly the 
thought of PAS as a cause of action in its own right seems unlikely. The area 
where PAS may be of most value, and where it has hitherto had the most 
162 L v S 15 FRNZ 408, 416. 
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impact, is where 'wishes' of the child are at issue. It is this area where PAS has 
tended to, simplify matters instead of making them more complex. 
Judges must be informed enough on the syndrome to look at it critically 
as a factor and avoid simply rubber-stamping the views of the psychiatric 
expert. Further, if the courts accept the syndrome they must be clear and 
differentiate their finding from bare Parental Alienation. If the court does not 
believe in the basis for a diagnosis it seems unwise to accept that diagnosis 
under a different name. 
There is a healthy scepticism in New Zealand regarding the Parental 
Alienation syndrome. It appears in many ways too like a persuasive theory of 
behaviour, and not enough than a psychiatric condition. However the 
similarities of symptoms and the literature on the subject cannot be entirely 
ignored. If New Zealand courts are going to continue to hear argument on the 
syndrome, it would be prudent to continue to move in the direction of the most 
recent case law: questioning more seriously what a finding of PAS means in 
terms of the well-being of the child, and what options for custody such a 
finding implies. 
To conclude, the appropriate approach to PAS should be one of more 
caution, but one also one of more faith. The syndrome should be questioned 
undoubtedly, but when a positive determination is made, the time for 
questioning should end and the focus should tum to formulating an appropriate 
response. 
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